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The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism 
Jim Rossi* 
For much of the past eighty years, courts have fixated on dual 
sovereignty as the organizing federalism paradigm under New Deal-era 
energy statutes.  Dual sovereignty’s reign emphasized a jurisdictional 
“bright line,” a fixed and legalistic boundary between federal and state 
regulators.  This Article explores how three recent Supreme Court decisions 
limit dual sovereignty’s role as the organizing federalism principle under 
energy statutes. 
These recent decisions do not approach federal–state jurisdiction as an 
either/or proposition, but instead recognize it is concurrent for many energy 
transactions.  Concurrent jurisdiction opens up a brave new path of 
possibilities for energy federalism but also has been a target of criticism, 
including in Justice Scalia’s last published dissent.  This Article defends 
concurrent jurisdiction as consistent with the language, history, structure, 
and primary purposes of energy statutes.  
At the same time, energy federalism’s path continues to navigate a trove 
of doctrinal relics from dual sovereignty’s reign, such as field preemption.  
These doctrines must be cleared from federalism’s path if regulators are to 
successfully address the challenges presented by modern energy markets: 
expanding clean-energy resources, integrating those resources into the grid, 
protecting reliability, addressing energy security, and monitoring 
anticompetitive conduct that is harmful to consumers, to name a few.  The 
Article concludes by calling on courts and regulators to be attentive to 
opportunities for promoting democratically-accountable agency preemption 
while addressing the challenges of new forms of energy federalism.  
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Introduction 
Federalism has always structured the regulation of domestic energy 
markets.  It has now been eighty years since Congress first began the 
regulation of interstate energy markets with the adoption of the Federal 
Power Act (FPA) in 19351 followed by the Natural Gas Act (NGA) in 1938.2  
Each of these statutes gave the Federal Power Commission (FPC), which 
later would become the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), 
jurisdiction to regulate wholesale energy sales but preserved state authority 
over retail transactions.  Courts traditionally refer to this allocation of 
authority between wholesale (federal) and retail (state) energy sales as the 
jurisdictional “bright line” that defines spheres of exclusive authority based 
on a fixed, legalistic inquiry.3 
For many decades following the New Deal, dual sovereignty4 coexisted 
rather peacefully with traditional utility-rate regulation in energy industries.  
The jurisdictional bright line proved useful for sorting out jurisdictional 
disputes where both state and federal regulators set energy prices under 
similar cost-of-service principles.  Aided by field-preemption doctrine, 
judicial recognition of comprehensive federal authority over wholesale 
 
1. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824–
824w (2012)). 
2. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–
717w (2012)). 
3. See, e.g., FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964); see also Robert R. 
Nordhaus, The Hazy “Bright Line”: Defining Federal and State Regulation of Today’s Electric 
Grid, 36 ENERGY L.J. 203, 206 (2015). 
4. By “dual sovereignty,” I mean the principle that “the nation and the states were each 
authorized to control autonomous and distinct domains of social life.”  Robert Post, Federalism in 
the Taft Court Era: Can It Be “Revived”?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1518 (2002). 
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energy sales helped to minimize the dysfunctions presented by state 
regulators’ insulation of energy utilities from the interstate energy market.5  
During this era, judicial resolution of federalism disputes helped to minimize 
the problems presented to energy firms by having two potential regulators 
and eased regulators’ implementation of traditional rate regulation.  Legal 
formalities such as the “filed rate doctrine” (which served as a form of federal 
preemption) helped to reinforce the jurisdictional bright line.6 
However, as these New Deal-era statutes enter their octogenarian phase, 
new developments in the energy industry have revealed serious cracks in the 
foundational facts behind dual sovereignty.7  Today, energy firms face a 
dynamic economic environment.  Energy markets, previously were insulated 
from the pressures of competition, now face volatility from new entrants and 
technologies.8  An electric-power sector once dominated by the staid, 
vertically integrated utility has evolved into a diverse range of energy 
suppliers and related service providers, many lacking the same service 
obligations as utilities.9  Customers who were once captive to regulated 
utilities now face choices of energy suppliers and are exposed to price 
volatility.10  New technologies such as digital metering interfaces, rooftop 
solar, and energy storage have also enabled customers to become energy 
 
5. As the Supreme Court has observed: 
[W]hen the FPA became law, most electricity was sold by vertically integrated utilities 
that had constructed their own power plants, transmission lines, and local delivery 
systems.  Although there were some interconnections among utilities, most operated 
as separate, local monopolies subject to state or local regulation.  Their sales were 
“bundled,” meaning that consumers paid a single charge that included both the cost of 
the electric energy and the cost of its delivery.  Competition among utilities was not 
prevalent. 
New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002).  For examples where the Court deployed field preemption 
vis-à-vis the NGA and FPA to invalidate state regulations, see Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 
485 U.S. 293, 310 (1988), and Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 
(1986). 
6. See Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a Deregulatory 
Era, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1642, 1645 (2003) (criticizing the filed tariff doctrine for producing 
a kind of implied preemption that “simply would not survive the appropriate preemption analysis”). 
7. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 145, 
146–47 (observing how changes in legal doctrine track changes in underlying factual assumptions). 
8. See PETER KIND, DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC 
RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 3, 7 (2013), 
http://www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N2DD-AA3Y] (observing that the “electric utility sector has not previously 
experienced a viable disruptive threat” but that could change due to “technological innovation” and 
“disruptive forces”). 
9. See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
765, 769–70, 772–75 (2008) (chronicling the unbundling of the vertically integrated monopolistic 
American energy market since the 1980s). 
10. Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 
VAND. L. REV. 141, 156 (2016). 
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resources.11  A once-predictable sector now faces disruption from rapid 
innovation and the onset (and occasional failure) of new technologies.12  With 
the rise of interstate energy markets since the 1990s, coupled with the 
transformation of the traditional public utility, state regulation of the energy 
sector can no longer operate in isolation of broader regional and national 
energy policies.13  The emergence of new environmental regulations of 
carbon emissions from existing power plants also calls into question the 
efficacy of any neat separation of federal and state spheres of authority.  As 
one recent agency report observes, any federal regulation of carbon emissions 
will require the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to coordinate its 
policies with state and federal energy regulators, depending on their support 
to ensure that environmental regulations do not interfere with reliable 
generation and transmission.14  
While it was once believed, at least by some, that federalism conflicts 
would begin to disappear with the rise of competitive energy markets,15 in 
fact the opposite has occurred.  The competitive threat of new technologies 
has seriously blurred the clear jurisdictional lines of dual sovereignty.16  
Litigants routinely invoke dual sovereignty as they ask courts to step in and 
referee any time regulators are perceived as stepping outside of their 
predefined bounds.17  At the extreme, dual sovereignty’s legacy can bind 
regulators by reinforcing judicially-defined limits on their authority.  This 
approach hamstrings agency regulators from adopting proactive regulatory 
approaches that can adapt as they seek to balance important goals in the 
regulation of energy markets, such as expanding clean-energy resources, 
integrating those resources into the grid, protecting reliability, addressing 
 
11. Nordhaus, supra note 3, at 212; Amy L. Stein, Distributed Reliability, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 
887, 888–90 (2016) (documenting the capacity of customers to both satisfy electricity demand as 
well as contribute to reliability resources—energy storage and demand response); see KIND, supra 
note 11, at 3–6 (predicting that the rise of new technologies may allow consumers to exit the grid). 
12. KIND, supra note 11, at 3. 
13. See James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith, Regulatory Federalism and Development of 
Electric Transmission: A Brewing Storm?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 71, 73–74 (2014) (defending the 
necessity of increased coordination between state and federal regulators in light of changes in 
electricity markets over the last two decades). 
14. See Press Release, FERC, EPA-DOE-FERC Coordination on Implementation of the Clean 
Power Plan 1–5 (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.ferc.gov/media/headlines/2015/CPP-EPA-DOE-
FERC.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GT6-RFYM].  For a discussion of the need for policy alignments 
between the EPA and FERC, see generally Todd S. Aagaard, Energy-Environment Policy 
Alignments, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1517 (2015). 
15. See, e.g., Charles G. Stalon & Reinier H.J.H. Lock, State-Federal Relations in the Economic 
Regulation of Energy, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 427, 431 (1990) (concluding that “in the long run the 
evolution of competition, in both the electric and gas industries, should do more to relieve than to 
exacerbate state/federal tensions”). 
16. Nordhaus, supra note 3, at 212. 
17. See infra subpart II(C) (discussing cases from the Third, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits). 
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energy security, and monitoring anticompetitive conduct that is harmful to 
consumers.18  
But in law as in life, sometimes “[e]nding is better than mending.”19  In 
this Article, I argue that, for all practical purposes, three recent Supreme 
Court decisions abandon dual sovereignty as the primary organizing principle 
for resolution of federalism disputes under energy statutes.  As an alternative, 
the Court has recognized agency authorization for concurrent federal–state 
jurisdiction over many energy transactions.  Concurrent jurisdiction 
challenges regulators and courts to address anew basic questions about the 
nature of regulatory jurisdiction, rather than fixating almost entirely on 
defining the scope of spheres of sovereignty.  Recognition of statutory 
authorization for concurrent jurisdiction, an approach akin to what Abbe 
Gluck calls “statutory federalism,”20 opens up possibilities for new energy 
federalism arrangements such as dynamic federalism and cooperative 
federalism.21  While there is little doubt that jurisdictional overlaps can 
sometimes create problems of their own, the Supreme Court’s recent 
opinions also clarify the statutory objective of closing regulatory gaps, 
namely avoiding a “no man’s land” where neither federal nor state regulators 
can effectively address problems in energy markets.  Still, concurrent 
jurisdiction will also present important new challenges for courts and energy 
markets as new federalism institutions emerge.  Adapting federal preemption 
doctrine to this brave new world of energy federalism can help ease the 
transition to new regulatory approaches and ensure that courts do not lose 
sight of the core objective behind these statutes. 
Part I introduces New Deal-era energy statutes, such as the FPA and the 
NGA.22  At the time these statutes were adopted, it was widely perceived that 
 
18. See Sharon B. Jacobs, Bypassing Federalism and the Administrative Law of Negawatts, 100 
IOWA L. REV. 885, 890 (2015) (noting that FERC’s recent initiatives “have run up against limits on 
federal jurisdiction in the FPA”); see also Steven Ferrey, Restructuring a Green Grid: Legal 
Challenges to Accommodate New Renewable Energy Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977, 1005 (2009) 
(noting that states run into similar limits). 
19. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 33 (Amereon House 1979) (1932). 
20. Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 1998 (2014). 
21. See William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy 
Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 883–84 (2016) (emphasizing 
experimentation and innovation benefits of horizontal-regulatory nonuniformity in the energy 
sector); Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1679–80 (2015) 
(presenting a model that operationalizes dynamic federalism theory in the climate- and clean-
energy-policy context); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 
MD. L. REV. 773, 807–40 (2013) (calling for a dynamic federalism model in the context of energy 
law); Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. L. REV. 
1283, 1288, 1331 (2013) (arguing that cooperative federalism is consistent with the FPA); Giovanni 
S. Saarman González, Note, Evolving Jurisdiction Under the Federal Power Act: Promoting Clean 
Energy Policy, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1422, 1466–69 (2016) (arguing that leaving some jurisdictional 
room over energy regulation to the states is advantageous for clean-energy policy). 
22. This Article focuses its discussion on federalism principles in the regulation of energy 
markets.  A related debate concerns energy federalism in energy production.  For a terrific 
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Congress was legislating to close the “Attleboro23 gap” attributed to dormant 
commerce clause limits on state regulation.  Congress gave federal regulators 
substantive and remedial tools to address this gap in interstate energy 
markets, charging federal regulators with the task of prohibiting 
discriminatory activities that harm consumers.  But Congress also did not 
intend to entirely displace state regulation.  These statutes also contain 
specific provisions that recognize the importance of preserving state 
authority over activities such as electric power generation and distribution, 
though courts have consistently interpreted these clauses narrowly rather than 
applying a presumption against preemption. 
Part II discusses the rise and historical reign of dual sovereignty in the 
regulation of energy markets.  Dual sovereignty reflected the constitutional 
federalism principles against which Congress was legislating in the 1930s 
and was reinforced by later judicial interpretations of the resulting statutes.  
Taking inspiration from the Interstate Commerce Commission’s regulation 
of railroad rates, the Supreme Court’s earliest decisions interpreting energy 
statutes recognized comprehensive federal jurisdiction over wholesale 
energy markets.  Federal authority under these statutes was not only 
recognized as plenary.  Courts also began to treat it as exclusive,24 giving rise 
to a jurisdictional divide between federal and state regulators.  This bright-
line approach purported to promote clarity, consistency, and uniformity, with 
courts routinely refereeing the balance of power in federal–state 
jurisdictional disputes by identifying formalistic boundaries.25 
 
discussion, see generally David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy 
of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (2013). 
23. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 (1927). 
24. The distinction between “plenary” and “exclusive” authority is important, but the two terms 
are often conflated in federalism discussions.  Plenary power is absolute and comprehensive, but an 
entity with plenary power may or may not choose to treat that power as exclusive.  It may choose 
to delegate power, as Congress often does in areas where it possesses plenary power (such as the 
Commerce Clause), or not to exercise it at all.  See, e.g., Cal. Bankers Ass’n. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 
59 (1974) (acknowledging the well-established authority of Congress to delegate its plenary powers 
to regulate foreign commerce).  If a court treats plenary authority as exclusive, it effectively takes 
away an important feature of plenary power, which is the option to delegate it elsewhere or to share 
it through inaction.  The only other substantive area where courts have treated the national 
government’s plenary authority as exclusive appears to be the federal power over immigration 
matters.  See Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 637, 639 (2013) 
(identifying a phenomenon similar to exclusive authority in the context of immigration matters, but 
labeling it “plenary power preemption”). 
25. As Justice Brennan once observed: 
Maintaining the proper balance between federal and state authority in the regulation of 
electric and other energy utilities has long been a serious challenge to both judicial and 
congressional wisdom.  On the one hand, the regulation of utilities is one of the most 
important of the functions traditionally associated with the police power of the States.  
On the other hand, the production and transmission of energy is an activity particularly 
likely to affect more than one State, and its effect on interstate commerce is often 
significant enough that uncontrolled regulation by the States can patently interfere with 
broader national interests. 
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In Part III, I argue that, while dual sovereignty has had a long reign, 
recent Supreme Court decisions abandon it as the primary federalism 
principle under energy statutes.  The Court first signaled fading of the 
jurisdictional bright line in New York v. FERC,26 a 2002 opinion that 
observed that changes in the landscape of the electric industry call into 
question whether the electricity universe is “‘neatly divided in spheres of 
retail versus wholesale sales.’”27  ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.,28 decided in 
2015, puts it even more starkly when it calls a “clear division between areas 
of state and federal authority” a “platonic ideal” that eludes modern natural-
gas markets.29  The Court’s 2016 opinion in FERC v. Electric Power Supply 
Ass’n (EPSA),30 upheld FERC’s rules for compensating demand response 
while departing from a strict notion of dual sovereignty and instead favoring 
a concurrent jurisdiction framework.31  
Justice Scalia vigorously dissented from this approach, claiming that the 
majority’s shift away from dual sovereignty in ONEOK smudges the line for 
determining jurisdiction and makes a “snarl” out of the Court’s precedents.32  
His last published dissent in EPSA also takes issue with the basic idea of 
concurrent jurisdiction.33  Still, I maintain, nothing in the structure or 
language of New Deal-era energy statutes requires dual sovereignty for all 
energy transactions that affect wholesale sales.  Moreover, I maintain, for 
many modern energy transactions related to wholesale energy markets, 
recognizing agency authorization for concurrent jurisdiction better advances 
the primary objective of these statutes, which is to close regulatory gaps 
rather than eliminate jurisdictional overlaps. 
In Part IV, I address the new challenges that concurrent jurisdiction and 
cooperative federalism under energy statutes present for courts.  First and 
most importantly, as the Supreme Court stated in its 2016 EPSA decision, 
regulation of modern energy markets can benefit from recognition that 
concurrent jurisdiction is sometimes necessary to prevent new forms of 
 
Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 377 (1983) (citation omitted). 
26. 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
27. Id. at 16 (quoting Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 691 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000)). 
28. 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015). 
29. Id. at 1601. 
30. 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). 
31. Id. at 776, 784 (“It is a fact of economic life that the wholesale and retail markets in 
electricity, as in every other known product, are not hermetically sealed from each other. . . .  When 
FERC sets a wholesale rate, when it changes wholesale-market rules, when it allocates electricity 
as between wholesale purchasers—in short, when it takes virtually any action respecting wholesale 
transactions—it has some effect, in either the short or the long term, on retail rates.  That is of no 
legal consequence.”). 
32. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1603, 1606 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
33. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 787–88 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I cannot imagine a more irrational 
interpretive principle than the following, upon which the majority evidently relies . . . .”). 
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regulatory gaps.  Some maintain that resolution of these energy federalism 
disputes will ultimately require courts to fit energy transactions into a fixed 
category of either federal or state jurisdiction.34  But an either/or mindset in 
approaching federalism can also undermine the legislative purpose of 
avoiding a regulatory “no man’s land.”  Although recent cases such as EPSA 
draw on this purpose to recognize expansive federal power, they also provide 
a symmetry for energy federalism.  Since federal authority is not exclusive, 
it supports state experimentation in many instances too.  For example, in 
many energy markets where FERC actively regulates wholesale transactions, 
states still retain considerable authority to adopt incentives for clean-energy 
resources, even after the Supreme Court’s decision finding preemption of 
state incentives for natural-gas plants last term in Hughes v. Talen Energy 
Marketing, LLC.35  I also argue that EPSA’s novel endorsement of FERC’s 
demand response rules as “a program of cooperative federalism”36 recognizes 
a considerable range of institutional options for federalism, from providing 
states an opportunity to “opt out” of federal programs (as has occurred with 
demand response) to allowing federal regulators to preempt state regulations 
that impede interstate energy markets. 
For concurrent jurisdiction to enable agency efforts like these, courts 
approaching energy preemption issues must also be attentive to dual 
sovereignty’s doctrinal relics.  Cases such as ONEOK and EPSA reveal the 
folly of field-preemption approaches for modern energy markets and the need 
to fundamentally rethink preemption analysis.  In recognizing that 
jurisdiction can expand or contract based on factual and pragmatic 
considerations, and is not a fixed legal category, courts must more clearly 
address how these statutes limit the scope of federal authority, without 
appealing to empty fictions of sovereignty that can crowd out state and local 
incentives for new energy resources.  While the Court’s recent decision in 
Hughes found federal preemption of state incentives for new power 
generation, importantly it did not adopt a categorical approach to preemption.  
Rather, it only prohibits state regulation that targets or aims directly at a per 
 
34. See, e.g., Ferrey, supra note 21, at 1003–08 (assuming that states will have to skate around 
the bright line created by the FPA in order to effectively regulate carbon emissions and develop 
feed-in tariffs to promote renewable energy); Jacobs, supra note 18, at 889 (advocating that federal 
regulators strategically bypass traditional jurisdictional lines set up by the FPA); Nordhaus, supra 
note 3, at 213 (advocating “legislative changes that redraw the Bright Line in a fashion that better 
accommodates today’s regulatory needs”). 
35. 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016) (striking down Maryland’s program to incentivize investments 
in natural-gas plants on the grounds that it “invades FERC’s regulatory turf” by “adjusting an 
interstate wholesale rate”); id. at 1299 (distinguishing Maryland’s program from other state 
programs which encourage “production of new or clean generation through measures ‘untethered 
to a generator’s wholesale market participation’”). 
36. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 780. 
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se just and reasonable wholesale rate.37  Thus, even after Hughes, courts 
should be wary of extending categorical approaches to preemption to state 
regulation of modern energy transactions, absent a careful assessment of the 
foundational facts regarding the interoperation of federal and state regulation.  
Finally, the significance of these foundational facts in resolving jurisdictional 
questions underscores a need to encourage institutional arrangements and 
procedures that enable agency (rather than judicial) preemption decisions.  
Agency decision-making functions as a more democratic and dynamic way 
of coordinating federal and state regulation of energy markets. 
My ultimate claim is not that jurisdictional lines that avoid regulatory 
overlaps are a bad idea or are always inconsistent with energy statutes.  
Rather, the foundational facts that once sustained a clear jurisdictional 
separation between federal and state regulators in the energy sector have 
simply changed.  Given these new factual conditions, it is more important 
than ever before that courts recognize that dual sovereignty no longer serves 
as the primary organizing paradigm for all energy transactions closely tied to 
the wholesale market.  Concurrent jurisdiction can serve as the organizing 
principle for many modern energy transactions, especially as new 
technologies and new kinds of energy resources are providing value for the 
energy system.  Such an approach can encourage state policy innovation 
while also allowing federal-agency regulators an expansive role in setting 
guiding principles, including the authority to preempt state regulation that 
impedes federal market policies.  Unlike former judicial precedents that rely 
on dual sovereignty, the Court’s recent decisions do not dictate a single 
federalism approach for all problems in energy regulation.  Rather, 
concurrent jurisdiction emboldens political institutions, rather than courts, to 
consider and make decisions about the federalism balance in regulation of 
interstate energy transactions. 
I. The New Deal-Era Statutory Framework 
Congress adopted the FPA in 1935 and the NGA in 1938 to close the 
regulatory gaps the Constitution imposed on states regulating interstate 
energy markets beyond their borders.  In this section, I present the primary 
historical problem Congress was aiming to solve in these statutes.  I also 
introduce the primary statutory authority and regulatory tools Congress gave 
federal regulators to address interstate energy markets.  Congress recognized 
substantial state authority in these statutes too, but the Supreme Court has 
narrowly interpreted any authority reserved exclusively to states. 
 
37. See Hughes, 1326 S. Ct. at 1298 (noting states may not achieve ends through “measures 
aimed directly at” FERC-regulated wholesale markets) (quoting ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599); id. at 
1299 (“We reject Maryland’s program only because it disregards an interstate wholesale rate 
required by FERC.”). 
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A. Closing Regulatory Gaps 
The FPA and NGA were adopted to address the regulatory void 
presented if interstate energy markets (primarily served at the time by state-
regulated electric utility and gas-supply monopolies) were left unregulated 
by the federal government.  Section 201 of the FPA extends federal 
jurisdiction to the FPC (FERC’s predecessor) to regulate “the sale of electric 
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce . . . .”38  Almost identical 
language appears in the NGA, which provides that its provisions “shall apply 
to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce” and to “the sale 
in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale . . . .”39 
Based on this language, federal jurisdiction over wholesale sales of 
energy is the starting point for understanding the statutory framework that 
governs the operation of energy markets.  Importantly, by granting federal 
regulators authority to regulate wholesale sales, these statutes do not 
authorize federal regulation of retail sales of energy.  Thus, it is important to 
note that in adopting both the FPA and the NGA, Congress did not give a 
federal agency comprehensive authority to set rates to protect all consumers, 
both wholesale and retail.  Instead, Congress was aiming to extend federal 
jurisdiction in order to avoid what at the time was a well-understood 
regulatory void in interstate energy markets. 
Prior to the adoption of the FPA in 1935, state commissions were 
powerless to regulate any interstate transactions by electric utilities.  The 
Supreme Court recognized this limit on state power explicitly in Public 
Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.  In that case, Rhode 
Island’s Narragansett Electric Lighting Company had entered a twenty-year 
contract to supply the full electricity requirements of the Massachusetts-
based Attleboro Steam and Electric Company.40  The parties filed the contract 
rate with the Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island.41  Several years 
later, Narragansett obtained a rate increase from the Rhode Island Public 
Utilities Commission, over Attleboro’s objections.42 
After this rate hike was appealed through the Rhode Island courts, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.43  The majority rejected Rhode Island’s 
 
38. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012)).  The FPA also extended federal jurisdiction to “the 
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce,” indicating that federal jurisdiction over 
transmission is more expansive than federal jurisdiction over energy sales.  Id. 
39. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821, 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 717(b) (2012)). 
40. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 84 (1927). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 85–86. 
43. Id. at 83, 86. 
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regulation of the rate for the sale of energy to a Massachusetts utility, citing 
the Commerce Clause.44  Specifically, the Court highlighted: 
[I]f Rhode Island could place a direct burden upon the interstate 
business of the Narragansett Company because this would result in 
indirect benefit to the customers of the Narragansett Company in 
Rhode Island, Massachusetts could, by parity of reasoning, reduce the 
rates on such interstate business in order to benefit the customers of 
the Attleboro Company in that State, who would have, in the 
aggregate, an interest in the interstate rate correlative to that of the 
customers of the Narragansett Company in Rhode Island.45 
According to the majority, the rate between Narragansett and Attleboro is 
“not subject to regulation by either of the two states in the guise of protection 
to their respective local interests; but, if such regulation is required it can only 
be attained by the exercise of the power vested in Congress.”46  Thus, the 
Court’s decision effectively disqualified both Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island from regulating the rate of the electricity contract, leaving any 
regulation of such prices to a nonexistent federal regime. 
Less than a decade later, Congress would address this with the adoption 
of the FPA.  The statute’s legislative history makes clear that closing the 
“Attleboro gap”—a regulatory void where neither the forwarding state nor 
the receiving state could regulate the pricing of electricity sold across state 
lines—was the legislation’s primary impetus.47  As the Supreme Court has 
 
44. Id. at 89. 
45. Id. at 90. 
46. Id. 
47. S. REP. NO. 74-621, at 17 (1935); H.R. REP. NO. 74-1318, at 7–8 (1935).  The general 
consensus was that, under Attleboro, the Commerce Clause denied the States power over any 
wholesale transaction in interstate commerce.  For confirmation, see generally Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935: Hearings on S. 1725 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 
74th Cong. (1935) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] and Public Utility Holding Companies: Hearings 
on H.R. 5423 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong. (1935) 
[hereinafter House Hearings].  The General Solicitor of the National Association of Railroad and 
Utilities Commissioners said during the House hearings: “[Attleboro] has been accepted by 
everybody as establishing . . . the fact that the State cannot regulate wholesale transactions, although 
it can regulate retail service and rate.”  House Hearings, supra, at 1657 (statement of John E. 
Benton, General Solicitor, National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners).  At the 
Senate hearings he said: 
The second part of the bill [section 201(b)] provides for regulation by the Federal 
Government of wholesale transactions in electric power.  Those are transactions which 
the United States Supreme Court has held are beyond the reach of the States under the 
Constitution.  The States have long regulated the rates charged by the local distributing 
companies to consumers; but they cannot reach the interstate producer supplying the 
distributing company. 
Senate Hearings, supra, at 756–57 (statement of John E. Benton, General Solicitor, National 
Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners).  “It therefore follows that if there is to be any 
regulation of the wholesale part of the electric and gas business which passes over State lines it must 
be supplied by the Federal Government.”  Id. at 768. 
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noted, “Congress interpreted [Attleboro] as prohibiting state control of 
wholesale rates in interstate commerce for resale.”48 
In the 1920s, the Supreme Court imposed a similar constitutional limit 
on state regulation of natural-gas sales,49 leading to the passage of the NGA 
by Congress in 1938.  Of course, modern-Dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis does not follow the same formalisms that characterized the Court’s 
pre-New Deal approach and is more likely to rely on pragmatic balancing.50  
Despite this, the Court has continued to recognize closing regulatory gaps as 
a primary objective behind (and the immediate impetus for) the FPA51—a 
statutory purpose that has taken on a heightened importance in disputes in 
modern energy markets.52 
B. Substantive and Remedial Regulatory Tools 
In order to address this interstate regulatory void in energy markets, 
Congress gave federal regulators a specific set of tools.  A significant 
problem associated with leaving interstate energy markets unregulated is the 
risk of monopolistic market-pricing abuses by suppliers, which can harm 
 
48. United States v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 345 U.S. 295, 308 (1953). 
49. See Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kan. Nat. Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 307 (1924) (holding that 
the Commerce Clause “restrains the states from imposing direct burdens upon interstate 
commerce”). 
50. See Post, supra note 4, at 1629–30 (relating the judicial method advanced by Justice Stone 
during the New Deal era, balancing all relevant circumstances and governmental interests, 
comparing that method to the approaches actually employed by the New Deal-era Court, and 
observing that “Stone’s perspective on judicial technique has become our own”); see also Frank R. 
Lindh, Federal Preemption of State Regulation in the Field of Electricity and Natural Gas: A 
Supreme Court Chronicle, 10 ENERGY L.J. 277, 314 (1989) (noting that “the mechanical approach 
to Commerce Clause questions in the older cases could produce seemingly arbitrary restrictions on 
the otherwise lawful regulatory powers of the states”).  For a discussion of modern-Dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and its application to the energy sector, see generally Alexandra 
B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review for Interstate Coordination, 
100 MINN. L. REV. 129 (2015). 
51. See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002) (“When it enacted the FPA in 1935, 
Congress authorized federal regulation of electricity in areas beyond the reach of state power, such 
as the gap identified in Attleboro . . . .”) (footnote omitted); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 
319 U.S. 61, 67–68 (1943) (“The primary purpose of Title II [of the FPA] . . . was to give a federal 
agency power to regulate the sale of electric energy across state lines. Regulation of such sales had 
been denied to the states by [Attleboro].”); see also Duke Power Co. v. FPC, 401 F.2d 930, 934 
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (“[I]t was primarily to fill the ‘Attleboro gap’ that Congress . . . passed the Federal 
Power Act as its first exertion of national authority over the operating electric utilities.”) (footnote 
omitted).  For a critical discussion of Attleboro, see Sam Kalen, Muddling Through Modern Energy 
Policy: The Dormant Commerce Clause and Unmasking the Illusion of an Attleboro Line, 24 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2674292 [https://perma.cc/6T9E-RFGZ] (arguing that Attleboro was 
dubious at the time it was decided and is especially dubious as a basis for drawing jurisdictional 
lines today). 
52. See discussion infra subpart IV(A). 
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both competitors and consumers.53  Concerned with a similar issue in the 
railroad context, Congress had previously vested the Interstate Commerce 
Commission with broad authority to reject unjust, unreasonable, or 
discriminatory rates.54 
The FPA and NGA adopt a similar approach for energy markets, 
assigning a federal agency—the FPC, FERC’s predecessor—the obligation 
to ensure that utility or pipeline rates are not unjust, unreasonable, or 
discriminatory.  Section 205 of the FPA provides that “[a]ll rates” subject to 
FERC’s jurisdiction along with “all rules and regulations affecting or 
pertaining to such rates or charges shall be just and reasonable” and declares 
that rates that do not meet this standard are unlawful.55  That section also 
requires any utility subject to FERC’s jurisdiction to file any change in its 
rates or related practices with FERC,56 and prohibits utilities from granting 
an “undue preference or advantage,” subjecting any person to “undue 
prejudice,” or maintaining any “unreasonable difference” in rates or “in any 
other respect.”57  Section 206 provides that whenever FERC finds that a rate 
for a jurisdictional sale or a “practice . . . affecting” the rate is “unjust, 
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential,” FERC is obligated to 
determine the appropriate rate.58 
FERC’s sections 205 and 206 regulatory jurisdiction clearly extends to 
the transmission as well as some sales of electricity (wholesale energy sales 
under section 201).59  I refer to this as FERC’s substantive jurisdiction over 
wholesale energy sales.  Importantly, however, the “practice . . . affecting” 
rates language in both sections 205 and 206 indicates that Congress also 
 
53. For a discussion of these harms, see Erwin L. Davis, The Influence of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Investigations on Federal Regulations of Interstate Electric and Gas Utilities, 14 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 21, 23 (1945). 
54. See Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, sec. 4, § 15, 34 Stat. 584, 589 (1906).  For discussion of how, 
in the adoption of the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress was also aiming to address a similar 
federalism problem with interstate railroad rates, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory 
Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1054–70 
(1988). 
55. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 205(a), 49 Stat. 838, 851 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012)). 
56. Id. at sec. 213, § 205(d), 49 Stat. at 851 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) 
(2012)). 
57. Id. at sec. 213, § 205(b), 49 Stat. at 851 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) 
(2012)). 
58. Id. at sec. 213, § 206(a), 49 Stat. at 852 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012)). 
59. Id. at sec. 213, § 205(a), 49 Stat. at 851 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012)) 
(“All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or in connection with 
the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . shall be 
just and reasonable . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. sec. 213 § 206(a), 49 Stat. at 852 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012)) (“Whenever the Commission . . . shall find that any 
rate . . . for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . is unjust, 
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and 
reasonable rate . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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intended FERC to have remedial jurisdiction over discriminatory market 
conduct that is not, itself, a wholesale energy sale.60  This distinction between 
substantive jurisdiction over the rates for wholesale energy sales and 
remedial jurisdiction over “practices . . . affecting” rates is not unique to 
electricity regulation. 
Nearly identical language appears in the NGA.61  Courts have read the 
FPA and NGA in pari materia to suggest that this language provides 
extensive federal authority over the interstate energy markets.62  Notably too, 
Congress was not writing on a blank slate when it adopted these statutes.  As 
Joel Eisen has shown, the substantive and remedial provisions of these energy 
statutes were based on language of the Interstate Commerce Act, which also 
contained “practices . . . affecting” remedial jurisdiction.63  Courts 
interpreted the FPA’s and NGA’s remedial provisions as allowing broad 
preemption of state regulation of utility investment and operational decisions, 
especially where state regulation threatened to contravene federally approved 
rates.64  
C. Impacts on State Regulation 
Congress adopted this structure for federal regulation of energy markets 
against the backdrop of existing (and, at the time, expanding) state regulation 
of energy sales.  At the time, and even today, states regulate utility sales to 
retail consumers.  While expansive federal power is undeniable under these 
statutes, it bears noting that in both the FPA and NGA Congress envisioned 
a significant, continued role for state regulation.  These statutes contain 
general policy statements regarding continued state regulation, as well as 
 
60. See Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority To Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1795–96 (2016) (describing the ability to set wholesale rates and remedy 
discriminatory practices affecting wholesale rates as the pillars of FERC’s authority under the FPA). 
61. See Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 4(a), 52 Stat. 821, 822 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 717c(a) (2012)) (“All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any natural-gas 
company for or in connection with the transportation or sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges, 
shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is declared 
to be unlawful.”); id. § 5(a), 52 Stat. at 823–24 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a)) 
(“Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint of any 
State, municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company, shall find that any rate, charge, 
or classification demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any natural-gas company in 
connection with any transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or 
classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall 
determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract 
to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order . . . .”). 
62. See, e.g., Ky. Util. Co. v. FERC, 760 F.2d 1321, 1325 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“It is, of course, 
well settled that the comparable provisions of the Natural Gas Act and the Federal Power Act are to 
be construed in pari materia.”). 
63. Eisen, supra note 60, at 1797–1812. 
64. See infra subpart II(B). 
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more specific clauses that limit federal authorization and preserve state 
power. 
For example, section 201(a) of the FPA states that federal regulation 
under the statute shall “extend only to those matters which are not subject to 
regulation by the States.”65  In its plain language, this clause might be taken 
to mean that, as of 1935, Congress meant to freeze in place the scope of 
existing state regulation.  Since the 1940s, however, the Supreme Court has 
consistently interpreted section 201(a) as “prefatory” in nature, a “mere 
policy declaration” that “cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of 
jurisdiction, even if the particular grant seems inconsistent with the broadly 
expressed purpose.”66 
Elsewhere in the FPA, Congress spoke more directly to areas where 
state regulation can continue without any federal interference.  For example, 
under section 201(b) of the FPA, Congress stated that, while FERC has 
jurisdiction over all “facilities” for the transmission or wholesale sale of 
energy, it does not have any jurisdiction over facilities “used for the 
generation of electric energy,” or facilities “used in local distribution or only 
for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce,” or “facilities 
for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter.”67  
The language of the NGA is similar, clearly exempting specific facilities 
from the reach of federal regulation.  For example, it states that federal 
regulation does not extend to “facilities” used for the “local distribution” or 
for “production or gathering” of gas.68  These provisions, which address 
specific facilities, appear to speak to some sphere of exclusive state authority. 
Beyond these specific facilities that are clearly reserved to the states, 
both the FPA and NGA limit the transactions that FERC is authorized to 
regulate.  Section 201(b) of the FPA notes that its provisions do not apply to 
“any other sale,” other than interstate transmission and the “sale of electric 
energy at wholesale.”69  The NGA also states that its provisions only apply 
to interstate transportation or wholesale sales.70 
 
65. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012)). 
66. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 22 (2002) (quoting FPC v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 
205, 215 (1964)); see also Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 319 U.S. 61, 74–77 (1943) 
(rejecting section 201(a) as a limit on express authority granted to federal regulators elsewhere in 
the FPA). 
67. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. at 847–48 (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012)). 
68. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821, 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 717(b) (2012)). 
69. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. at 847 (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. § 824(b)). 
70. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 1(b), 52 Stat. at 821 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 717(b)). 
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In a case that has since been reversed by the Supreme Court, a D.C. 
Circuit panel recently interpreted section 201 of the FPA as providing states 
an exclusive sphere of jurisdiction over retail sales.71  While a strong 
endorsement of dual sovereignty, this approach is inconsistent with other 
judicial decisions that interpret section 201 narrowly and refuse to find a clear 
reservation of exclusive authority for states over retail sales.  For example, a 
2002 Supreme Court decision upholding FERC’s competitive restructuring 
of wholesale electric power markets refused to apply a presumption against 
preemption to limit federal jurisdiction under the FPA.72  That opinion also 
recognized that the starting place for determining whether federal power may 
be exercised in an area of preexisting state regulation “is to examine the 
nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress to the agency”73—an 
approach that the Supreme Court endorsed even more strongly in its 2016 
EPSA opinion, which I return to below.74 
II. Dual Sovereignty’s Reign 
Courts have been repeatedly asked to address disputes surrounding the 
scope of federal regulatory authority over energy markets.  Until recent years, 
judicial decisions addressing federalism did not dwell on the nature of federal 
jurisdiction under energy statutes.  Rather, in the immediate years following 
enactment of these statutes, the Supreme Court quickly settled on a dual 
sovereignty approach that depended upon the judiciary to set a bright line 
separating spheres of federal and state jurisdiction.  Courts applying this 
approach routinely characterized federal authority as “plenary,” inviting 
many confused discussions of jurisdiction under the FPA and NGA. 
Initial decisions drew on Interstate Commerce Act precedents to project 
a dual sovereignty approach onto these statutes.  The common doctrinal 
reasoning used to support this was that federal regulators “occupy the field” 
of wholesale energy sales.  Courts began to treat Congress’s delegations of 
authority to agencies as not only plenary (or comprehensive), but as an 
endorsement of exclusive sovereignty.  Applying this approach, federal 
courts rejected a broad range of subnational regulatory initiatives that 
conflicted with federally approved wholesale energy prices, including 
antitrust, tort, and breach of contract claims, under what is known as the 
“filed rate doctrine.”75  These courts also extended the reach of dual 
 
71. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 224 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d, FERC v. 
Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). 
72. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18, 25–28 (2002). 
73. Id. at 18 (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986)). 
74. See infra subpart III(B). 
75. The filed rate doctrine “holds that interstate power rates filed with FERC or fixed by FERC 
must be given binding effect by state utility commissions determining intrastate rates.”  Nantahala 
Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 962 (1986).  For a critique of courts’ tendency to 
invoke the filed rate doctrine, see Rossi, supra note 6, at 1642–46. 
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sovereignty beyond federal authority over actual wholesale energy sales, 
sometimes treating “practices . . . affecting” rates as within the exclusive 
authority of federal regulators.  
After presenting dual sovereignty’s reign and its implications for 
federalism under energy statutes, I present some prominent modern examples 
of how lower courts have continued to rely on bright-line jurisdictional 
analysis to make sweeping jurisdictional conclusions about energy statutes 
without any careful analysis of foundational facts surrounding the operation 
of energy markets.  Dual sovereignty continues to cast a shadow upon 
regulation of modern energy markets, affecting state initiatives for customer 
energy resources and state incentives for new, low-carbon power generation 
facilities.  These examples present an important opportunity for courts to 
clarify the role of foundational facts in sustaining federal regulation of energy 
markets. 
A. The Tradition of “Bright Line” Jurisdiction 
Following the adoption of New Deal-era energy statutes, courts initially 
interpreted the scope of federal regulatory authority in an expansive manner.  
Federal jurisdiction under energy statutes found a parallel in Justice 
Brandeis’s interpretation of similar language from the Interstate Commerce 
Act, which held that state railroad regulation was field preempted.  This 
rather formalistic approach endorsed dual sovereignty’s premise that federal 
and state regulators occupy distinct spheres of regulatory jurisdiction. 
A 1926 opinion written by Justice Brandeis—who six years later penned 
his famous dissent celebrating states as laboratories of democracy76—stands 
as one of the strongest field-preemption rulings under an economic-
regulation statute.  In Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.,77 the 
Supreme Court held that Congress intended to “occupy the field” of railroad 
safety when it delegated the authority to regulate it to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission under the Boiler Inspection Act (adopted in 1911).78  
In rejecting state safety regulations for railroad employees, Justice Brandeis 
wrote for a unanimous Court: 
It is also urged that, even if the Commission has power to prescribe an 
automatic firebox door and a cab curtain, it has not done so; and that 
it has made no other requirement inconsistent with the state legislation.  
This, also, if true, is without legal significance.  The fact that the 
Commission has not seen fit to exercise its authority to the full extent 
conferred, has no bearing upon the construction of the Act delegating 
the power.  We hold that state legislation is precluded, because the 
Boiler Inspection Act, as we construe it, was intended to occupy the 
 
76. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
77. 272 U.S. 605 (1926). 
78. Id. at 611–13; Boiler Inspection Act, ch. 103, 36 Stat. 913 (1911) (amended 1915). 
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field.  The broad scope of the authority conferred upon the 
Commission leads to that conclusion.  Because the standard set by the 
Commission must prevail, requirements by the States are precluded, 
however commendable or however different their purpose.79 
Napier’s form of field preemption finds exclusive federal jurisdiction based 
entirely on the delegation of broad regulatory authority to an agency without 
any additional evaluation of congressional intent or how an agency actually 
regulates an activity.  Justice Brandeis considered this a groundbreaking 
decision, heralding it as a statutory-construction doctrine of preemption 
unless Congress states otherwise, something akin to a presumption favoring 
agency preemption.80 
Napier has never been overruled.  The decision influenced the post-New 
Deal Court’s expansion of federal preemption under a number of statutes.  
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.81 echoed Napier’s basic principle, holding 
that the relevant test for the displacement of state law is “whether the matter 
on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the 
Federal Act.”82  
Rice and later cases recognize additional factors that are also relevant to 
any judicial finding of federal preemption—including how “pervasive” the 
actual scheme of regulation is.83  Under statutes such as the FPA and NGA, 
however, courts have made broad findings of preemption based on the simple 
fact of delegation, with little additional evidence that Congress intended 
regulation to be pervasive or that state regulation was inconsistent with the 
approach of federal regulators.84  Under these statutes, courts recognized that 
Congress’s broad delegation of authority to agency regulators created plenary 
federal jurisdiction over wholesale energy markets.  A bright-line approach 
to the federal–state division reinforces this idea and has continued to 
 
79. Napier, 272 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added). 
80. Justice Brandeis wrote to Felix Frankfurter the day after the Napier decision was issued: 
In [Napier] I have endeavored to make clear, as a matter of statutory construction, the 
“occupying the field” doctrine.  I think the states could be taught, by a similar ABC 
article that, if they wish to preserve their police power, they should, through the “state 
block” in Congress, see to it in every class of Congressional legislation that the state 
rights which they desire to preserve be expressly provided for in the acts. 
Letter from Louis Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 30, 1926), in “HALF BROTHER, HALF SON”: 
THE LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS TO FELIX FRANKFURTER 262, 263 (Melvin I. Urofsky & 
David W. Levy eds., 1991). 
81. 331 U.S. 218 (1947). 
82. Id. at 236 (emphasis added). 
83. As the Court stated in Rice, a purpose to preempt can be evidenced in many ways: the 
scheme of federal regulation may be “so pervasive so as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” the federal interest may be “so dominant that 
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,” or 
“the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it 
may reveal the same purpose.”  Id. at 230. 
84. See infra subpart II(B). 
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encourage both courts and regulators to treat as exclusive the authority 
delegated to federal regulators.85  This approach was widely perceived as 
reinforcing a fixed jurisdictional line that promised to resolve federalism 
questions “in a consistent and predictable manner.”86 
For example, one of the Supreme Court’s earliest decisions interpreting 
the NGA claims that Congress “has given plenary authority [to a federal 
agency] to regulate extensions of gas transportation facilities and their 
physical connection with those of distributors, as well as the sale of gas to 
them.”87  The most famous formulation of this approach is what has come to 
be known as the bright-line jurisdictional test: 
The line of the statute was thus clear and complete.  It cut sharply and 
cleanly between sales for resale and direct sales for consumptive uses.  
No exceptions were made in either category for particular uses, 
quantities or otherwise.  And the line drawn was that one at which the 
decisions had arrived in distributing regulatory power before the Act 
was passed.88 
This dual sovereignty approach endorsed a legalistic test that, in effect, gave 
federal regulators the exclusive authority to regulate wholesale sales of gas, 
while relegating state regulators jurisdiction over retail sales.89 
Nearly two decades later, in interpreting the FPA, the Court elaborated 
that electric power markets also contain a jurisdictional bright line, dividing 
federal and state regulatory authority based on the nature of the activity: 
Congress meant to draw a bright line easily ascertained, between state 
and federal jurisdiction, making unnecessary such case-by-case 
analysis [of conflicts].  This was done in the Power Act by making 
FPC jurisdiction plenary and extending it to all wholesale sales in 
interstate commerce except those which Congress has made explicitly 
subject to regulation by the States.90 
Again, in describing federal authority as “plenary,” the Court meant to 
describe federal authority under the statute as comprehensive, if not 
exclusive.  On this approach, the effect of finding any federal authority over 
wholesale energy markets was typically to field preempt state regulation. 
B. Field Preemption of Traditional Rate Regulation 
One of the highest profile modern endorsements of field preemption is 
in the context of nuclear regulation.  In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State 
 
85. See infra subpart II(C). 
86. Lindh, supra note 50, at 278. 
87. Ill. Nat. Gas Co. v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498, 510 (1942). 
88. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 517 (1947). 
89. For a discussion of the competing views on this subject, see Clinton A. Vince & John S. 
Moot, Federal Preemption Versus State Utility Regulation in a Post-Mississippi Era, 10 ENERGY 
L.J. 1, 4–5 (1989). 
90. FDC v. S. Cal. Edison, 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964). 
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Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission,91 the Supreme 
Court held that a California statute authorizing state regulation of the 
economic aspects of nuclear generating plants was not preempted by the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.92  The Court noted that under the Atomic Energy 
Act, federal regulators “maintain[] complete control of the safety and 
‘nuclear’ aspects of energy generation.”93  “[T]he Federal Government has 
occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns,” the Court reasoned, but 
“the [California] statute does not seek to regulate the construction or 
operation of a nuclear powerplant”94 so it was not preempted.  Unlike a state 
moratorium on nuclear construction for safety reasons, which would fall 
squarely within the prohibited field, the California law did not fall to 
preemption because, the Court concluded, it “was aimed at economic 
problems, not radiation hazards.”95 
As the Court’s Pacific Gas & Electric’s analysis indicates, modern field 
preemption doctrine has departed from the approach Justice Brandeis 
endorsed in Napier.  Rather than focusing on the sweeping scope of a 
congressional delegation to federal regulators as fixing an exclusive sphere 
of federal authority, modern preemption analysis focuses on the aim of state 
regulation.96  From this alone, it might appear that the modern Court disfavors 
a strong presumption in favor of preemption, giving states considerable 
leeway to regulate without interfering with federal policies, as occurred with 
nuclear regulation.  Yet, two subsequent decisions from the 1980s make 
broad field-preemption findings under energy statutes, showing how Justice 
Brandeis’s approach in Napier has continued to wield influence.  Close 
analysis of these cases reveals dual sovereignty’s continued reign over energy 
federalism and a Court struggling with its fixation on divining a clear 
statutory divide between federal and state authority.  
In its 1986 decision in Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg,97 
the Supreme Court found field preemption of state retail-rate regulation that 
contravened FERC-approved wholesale power rates.98  There, two wholly 
owned subsidiary companies, Nantahala and Tapoco, each sold hydroelectric 
power they produced to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).99  In 
exchange, Nantahala and Tapoco jointly received a fixed supply of low-cost 
“entitlement power” from the TVA.100  In a wholesale ratemaking 
 
91. 461 U.S. 190 (1983). 
92. Id. at 205, 216. 
93. Id. at 212. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 213. 
96. See subpart III(b) and Part IV. 
97. 476 U.S. 953 (1986). 
98. Id. at 959–62, 966. 
99. Id. at 954–55. 
100. Id. at 955. 
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proceeding, FERC set the allocation of this “entitlement power” Nantahala 
would receive.101  North Carolina regulators, for the purposes of calculating 
the rate that Nantahala could charge its retail customers, chose a different 
entitlement allocation, rejecting FERC’s methodology.102  This approach for 
setting retail rates was upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court.103 
On review the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, applying what is known as 
the “filed rate doctrine,” an obscure regulatory principle aimed at “enforcing 
the Supremacy Clause.”104  Nantahala invoked precedents involving rate 
approval by the Interstate Commerce Commission, suggesting that federal 
regulation is “supreme and exclusive.”105  It also noted that precedents 
involving both electric and gas regulation “uniformly” recognize “the need 
to enforce the exclusive jurisdiction vested by Congress in FERC over the 
regulation of interstate wholesale utility rates.”106  Under the FPA, the Court 
reasoned, “FERC clearly has exclusive jurisdiction over the rates to be 
charged . . . interstate wholesale customers.”107 
Significantly, the Nantahala court observed, the pragmatic reach of the 
filed rate doctrine “is not limited to ‘rates’ per se”108 but also includes 
practices that “directly affect[]” wholesale rates, such as the allocation of the 
amount of low-cost hydroelectric power.109  Because the effect of the North 
Carolina ruling would be to “trap[]” FERC-approved wholesale costs, it 
would deny Nantahala the ability to fully recover its costs of purchasing at a 
FERC-approved rate.110  Thus, the Supreme Court rejected the North 
Carolina ruling.111  
A year later, the Court again relied on the filed rate doctrine to preempt 
a state proceeding in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. 
Moore.112  There, the Court held that an order requiring an electric utility to 
purchase a portion of the nuclear plant’s output at FERC-determined rates 
preempted state inquiry into management decisions leading to the 
construction of the nuclear plant.113  
 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 959–60. 
103. Id. at 961. 
104. Id. at 963, 973. 
105. Id. at 964 (citing Chicago & Nw. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 
(1981) (quoting Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U.S. 404, 408 (1925))). 
106. Id. at 965–66. 
107. Id. at 966 (emphasis added). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 967. 
110. Id. at 970. 
111. Id. at 971–73. 
112. 487 U.S. 354 (1988). 
113. Id. at 356–57, 369–70. 
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These applications of the filed rate doctrine to find plenary preemption 
of electric-power regulation involving wholesale rates were followed by an 
even more sweeping invocation of field preemption to FERC’s regulation of 
interstate-gas markets.  In Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co.,114 the Court 
also recognized that the NGA constitutes a “comprehensive scheme of 
federal regulation of ‘all wholesales of natural gas in interstate 
commerce.’”115  The Court reasoned that FERC’s authority to set just and 
reasonable rates “permits [the agency] to control, albeit indirectly, a natural-
gas company’s capital structure.”116  It also highlighted that the requirement 
that FERC issue a “certificate of public convenience and necessity” for any 
new facility for the transport or sale of gas in interstate commerce provides 
the agency broad authority to ensure a project is financed in accordance with 
the public interest.117  To the extent that a Michigan law was intended to 
protect against overcapitalization and excessive rates for facilities that are “a 
critical part” of the transportation of and interstate market in natural gas, the 
Court reasoned, the law was “an attempt to regulate matters within FERC’s 
exclusive jurisdiction.”118 
The Supreme Court’s approach to field preemption in these decisions 
relied on a number of routine aphorisms that served to sustain dual 
sovereignty.  For example, consider the oft-cited principle that FERC 
possesses “plenary” authority over wholesale energy markets.  Somewhat 
dubiously, the Court took this to not only mean comprehensive (the standard 
meaning of plenary in jurisdictional analysis).  It also equated plenary with 
“exclusive.”   
Notable too, with no analysis, Nantahala and Schneidewind extend 
FERC’s “exclusive” jurisdiction beyond the setting of wholesale rates.  These 
cases also include within the scope of field preemption any “practice . . . 
affecting” rates where the aim of state regulation encroaches onto FERC’s 
“exclusive purview.”119  The Court’s preemption findings under these 
statutes paid little attention to actual foundational facts regarding the 
operation of federal and state regulation in energy markets and made no effort 
to distinguish FERC’s substantive jurisdiction over wholesale rates from its 
remedial jurisdiction over “practices . . . affecting” rates.  
 
114. 485 U.S. 293 (1988). 
115. Id. at 300 (quoting N. Nat. Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 84, 91 (1963) 
(quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 682 (1954))). 
116. Id. at 302. 
117. Id. at 302–03. 
118. Id. at 307–08. 
119. Id. at 308; Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 956, 966.  As the Court clarified in Schneidewind, “every 
state statute that has some indirect effect on rates and facilities of natural-gas companies is not 
preempted.”  Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 308.  Instead, such preemption only extends to those state 
laws with a “central purpose” of regulating “matters Congress intended FERC to regulate.”  Id. at 
308–09. 
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Such unreflective applications of field preemption over wholesale 
energy markets presumptively favored federal authority as a way of 
advancing many pragmatic regulatory objectives.  For example, under the 
traditional approach to regulating vertically integrated utilities, both federal 
and state authorities set rates based on similar consumer-protection and cost-
of-service principles.120  Given these parallel policy goals, a presumption in 
favor of federal preemption helped to ensure that costs were not trapped (and 
left unrecoverable) while also making sure that utility shareholders did not 
receive a windfall through overcompensation of their expenses.121  
But, even with traditional utility regulation, the ability of dual 
sovereignty to solve jurisdictional disputes based on a fixed-jurisdictional 
line proved somewhat elusive.122  Contrary to Justice Brandeis’s 
methodology in Napier, which eschews any case-by-case analysis, both 
Nantahala and Schneidewind ultimately required courts to evaluate some 
foundational facts regarding how specific state law interacts with federal 
regulation in energy markets prior to a preemption finding.  Thus, while 
courts appealed to field preemption to support exclusive regulation of 
wholesale energy markets under energy statutes, courts were ultimately 
unable to avoid case-by-case determinations in addressing many of these 
energy-federalism disputes.123 
C.  Dual Sovereignty’s Modern Legacy 
As modern energy markets have evolved, many courts addressing 
federalism disputes continue to fixate on the formalisms of the jurisdictional 
bright line.  Courts continue to rely on fixed jurisdictional categories, even 
as federal energy regulation has moved away from cost-of-service principles 
to focus instead on competitive markets.  Courts have routinely treated the 
existence of a federally approved wholesale rate as categorically preempting 
any state regulation of the same activity.124  Some courts have even found 
preemption based on nothing more than a delegation to a federal regulator, 
reasoning that federal authority forecloses the other regulator from 
 
120. For descriptions of parallel-rate regulation of electric power until the 1980s, see generally 
RICHARD F. HIRSCH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE 
AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999); PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, 
MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION 13–20 (1983). 
121. See Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 970–71 (observing the problem of “trapped” costs); Steven J. 
Ferrey, Shaping American Power: Federal Preemption and Technological Change, 11 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 47, 58–59 (1991) (same); Vince & Moot, supra note 89, at 29–30 (same). 
122. A point highlighted nicely by Vince & Moot, supra note 89, at 4–5. 
123. For further discussion of how courts had to develop exceptions and rely on case-by-case 
analysis of specific tensions between federal and state regulators, see infra section IV(C)(1). 
124. See Rossi, supra note 6, at 1605–10 (discussing preemption in the context of filed rate 
claims). 
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addressing the same market activity at all.125  These applications of dual 
sovereignty rarely rely on a careful assessment of foundational facts 
surrounding the operation of energy markets; rather, courts are more inclined 
to rely on sweeping jurisdictional conclusions that all regulatory authority 
lies on one side or the other of a fixed dividing line. 
One high-profile illustration is the D.C. Circuit’s 2014 opinion rejecting 
FERC’s regulation of compensation for “demand response”126 (commitments 
not to consume electricity, also known as “negawatts”127) in interstate-power 
markets, which was reversed by the Supreme Court in 2016.128  FERC’s rules 
defined demand response as “a reduction in the consumption of electric 
energy by customers from their expected consumption in response to an 
increase in the price of electric energy or to incentive payments designed to 
induce lower consumption of electric energy.”129  Importantly, by its very 
definition, demand response is not a wholesale energy sale, which FERC 
clearly would have jurisdiction to regulate under section 201 of the FPA.130  
Instead, FERC based its statutory authority for these rules on its remedial 
authority to ensure that “all rules and regulations affecting . . . rates” in 
connection with the wholesale sales of energy are “just and reasonable” under 
sections 205 and 206 of the FPA.131 
The D.C. Circuit did not buy this argument, striking down FERC’s 
demand response rule as ultra vires under the FPA.132  The panel decision, 
written by Judge Janice Rogers Brown and joined by Judge Laurence 
Silberman, reasoned that FERC’s rationale for jurisdiction “has no limiting 
principle.”133  Without boundaries, sections 205 and 206 “could ostensibly 
authorize FERC to regulate any number of areas, including the steel, fuel, 
and labor markets.”134  FERC had maintained that a limit to the practices-
affecting jurisdictional argument was based on demand response providers 
 
125. Id. at 1610–15 (discussing agency deference in the context of antitrust and the filed rate 
doctrine). 
126. EPSA v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 218 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
127. Id. at 225–30 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
128. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). 
129. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(b)(4) (2016). 
130. See Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012)) (“The provisions of this Part shall apply to . . . the sale 
of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce . . . .”). 
131. Id. at sec. 213, §§ 205–06; EPSA, 753 F.3d at 221. 
132. EPSA, 753 F.3d at 225.  The D.C. Circuit also held that FERC’s rule was arbitrary and 
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because FERC failed to provide a “direct 
response” to some of the arguments that FERC’s rule would overcompensate demand response, 
resulting in discriminatory rates.  Id. at 224–25.  Importantly, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. 
Circuit, finding in favor of FERC on jurisdiction as well as the arbitrary-and-capricious inquiry and 
upholding FERC’s demand response rules.  EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 773. For a full analysis of this case, 
see infra subpart III(B). 
133. EPSA, 753 F.3d at 221. 
134. Id. 
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choosing to participate in wholesale markets, but the D.C. Circuit 
characterized this kind of effort to “lure” what would have been retail sales 
into the wholesale market as “the heart of” the jurisdictional challenge before 
the court.135 
The D.C. Circuit panel went on to identify a specific jurisdictional 
limitation on FERC’s authority in the FPA.  Specifically, it referenced a 
clause in section 201(a) of the FPA, which states that FERC’s reach 
“extend[s] only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the 
States.”136  As a result of this clause, along with other language in 201(b) that 
makes the FPA inapplicable to “any other sale” (other than wholesale 
sales),137 the D.C. Circuit reasoned that “[s]tates retain exclusive authority to 
regulate the retail market.”138  The court further explained that sections 205 
and 206 do not constitute a “clear and specific grant of jurisdiction” that could 
trump the specific limits in section 201 and effectively “render the retail 
market prohibition useless.”139  Instead, the D.C. Circuit concluded, 
“[b]ecause FERC’s rule entails direct regulation of the retail market—a 
matter exclusively within state control—it exceeds the Commission’s 
authority.”140 
In another recent series of decisions surrounding state incentives for 
power generation, lower courts have relied on dual sovereignty to support 
sweeping federal preemption of state regulation.  Traditionally, FERC 
directly set rates for the sale of energy at wholesale.  However, the interstate 
energy market has shifted away from local monopolies, which dominated the 
industry at the time of the FPA’s passage, to a system of interstate 
competition.141  Under this approach, FERC has authorized the creation of 
various “regional transmission organizations” (RTO)—multistate 
institutions, which serve to coordinate organized energy markets in the most 
populated areas of the United States.142  One of these is PJM Interconnected 
(PJM), a voluntary RTO which administers a regional market that includes 
 
135. Id. at 221–22. 
136. Id. at 221 (quoting Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012))). 
137. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012)). 
138. EPSA, 753 F.3d at 221. 
139. Id. at 222. 
140. Id. at 224.  In a dissent, Judge Harry Edwards treated the jurisdictional issue as ambiguous 
under the FPA and indicated that he would have deferred to FERC’s interpretation of the statute.  
Id. at 227 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
141. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5–8 (2002) (identifying legislative changes, technical 
advances, and an increased number of electricity suppliers as the causes of the shift). 
142. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g) (2016). 
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Maryland.143  PJM operates a “real-time” energy market (enabling PJM to 
buy and sell electricity for delivery to distributors within the next hour) and 
a “day-ahead” market for power-generation capacity.144 
In addition PJM operates a “capacity” market,145 which gives buyers an 
option to purchase electricity in the future.146  In operating it, PJM sets a quota 
based on how much capacity it predicts will be needed three years into the 
future, and then relies on what is known as a Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) 
to determine the appropriate per-unit price.147  This price reflects the high-
priced bid, based on a PJM-managed auction.148  In approving PJM’s initial 
capacity market, FERC endorsed a minimum-offer-price rule that required 
new generators to bid at or above a specified price in certain circumstances, 
in order to prevent the manipulation of market clearing prices through the 
exercise of buyer market power; this decision potentially exempted certain 
state-mandated power generators and allowed them to bid at zero.149  
However, following a complaint lodged by several generators, FERC 
eliminated the exemption for state-supported power plants and required these 
plants to bid at the agency-specific minimum price.150  The agency reasoned 
that this adjustment was necessary to protect the integrity of wholesale 
capacity markets against below-cost bids by subsidized plants.151 
 
143. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 801 (D. Md. 2013), aff’d 753 
F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 
(2016). 
144. Id. at 804. 
145. Capacity is “a standby commitment made by a capacity resource to either produce electric 
energy or to consume less electric energy at a time in the future when called upon by PJM to do so.”  
Id. at 806.  Importantly, a capacity market is not the same as an energy market. 
In a capacity market, in contrast to a wholesale energy market, an electricity provider 
purchases from a generator an option to buy a quantity of energy, rather than 
purchasing the energy itself.  Accordingly, the purchase of capacity is the purchase of 
a capacity resource’s availability either to supply energy . . . or to reduce the demand 
for electric energy on the transmission system at some defined future time.  A purchase 
of capacity is not a purchase of actual electric energy, but is instead a purchase of a 
resource capable of producing, or reducing demand for, electric energy in the 
transmission system when requested. 
Id.  (internal quotations, footnotes, and citations omitted).  Notably, both the FPA and NGA speak 
only to FERC having direct jurisdiction over the wholesale sale of energy.  Federal Power Act, ch. 
687, sec. 213, § 201, 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012)); 
Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821, 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 717(b) (2012)).  Still, even if capacity does not itself constitute a wholesale sale of energy, FERC 
can potentially use its remedial jurisdiction over practices affecting energy rates to regulate the 
capacity market. 
146. PPL EnergyPlus, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 806. 
147. Id. at 805–06. 
148. Id.  Under the RPM, auction participants bid to sell capacity for a single year, three years 
in the future, and then PJM ranks the bids from highest to lowest and, starting at the bottom, accepts 
bids until it has sufficient capacity to meet its quota.  Id. at 806–12. 
149. Id. at 809; PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 119 FERC ¶ 61,318, at para. 163 (2007). 
150. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 137 FERC ¶ 61,145, at para. 93, 96 (2011). 
151. Id. 
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The state of Maryland adopted competitive retail markets in 1999 and 
authorized its utilities to participate in the PJM RTO.152  However, portions 
of Maryland and D.C. are located in an area that the state of Maryland 
believed to be at heightened “risk for reliability problems,” creating a need 
for generation sources in these particular areas.153  Thus, the Maryland Public 
Service Commission solicited proposals for a new power plant, offering the 
successful bidder a twenty-year revenue stream secured by contracts for 
differences.154  Competitors of the winning bidder for Maryland’s incentives 
sued, alleging federal preemption of the Maryland incentives.155  A federal 
district court agreed, finding that FERC’s order field preempts the Maryland 
scheme, because the contracts-for-differences prices have the effect of setting 
the ultimate price that the winning Maryland generator receives in the PJM 
market.156 
In a unanimous panel decision for the Fourth Circuit, Judge James 
Harvie Wilkinson III affirmed the lower court holding that FERC regulation 
of the interstate capacity market preempts the Maryland incentive 
program.157  The court reasoned that the breadth of the grant of authority to 
federal regulators, as stated in the FPA’s declaration of policy, “is confirmed 
by the FPA’s similarly capacious substantive and remedial provisions” in 
sections 205 and 206.158  Citing a “wealth of case law [that] confirms FERC’s 
exclusive power to regulate wholesale sales of energy in interstate 
commerce,”159 the court reasoned that “if FERC has jurisdiction over a 
subject the States cannot have jurisdiction over the same subject.”160  The 
court also highlighted that the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the 
notion that the “scope of [FERC’s] jurisdiction . . . is to be determined by a 
case-by-case analysis of the impact of state regulation upon the national 
interest.”161  Instead, “Congress meant to draw a bright line easily 
ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction. . . .  This was done in the 
[FPA] by making [FERC] jurisdiction plenary and extending it to all 
wholesale sales in interstate commerce except those which Congress has 
made explicitly subject to regulation by the States.”162 
 
152. PPL EnergyPlus, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 814–15. 
153. Id. at 819–20. 
154. Id. at 821–24. 
155. Id. at 796. 
156. Id. at 840. 
157. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 471 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom. 
Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). 
158. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012)); PPL EnergyPlus, 753 F.3d at 474–75. 
159. PPL EnergyPlus, 753 F.3d at 474–75. 
160. Id. at 475 (quoting Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 
377 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
161. Id. (quoting Nantahala Power & Light Co. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986)). 
162. Id. (quoting Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 966). 
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Applying these principles, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the 
Maryland generation scheme was field preempted because it “functionally 
sets the rate” that the winning bidder “receives for its sales in the PJM 
auction.”163  Maryland regulators argued that the state does not actually set a 
rate because it “does not directly affect the terms of any transaction in the 
federal market.”164  However, in the view of the Fourth Circuit, allowing the 
state’s scheme to stand “compromises the integrity of the federal scheme and 
intrudes on FERC’s jurisdiction.”165  In support of this conclusion, the court 
cited Supreme Court precedents that found federal preemption of state laws 
that would have barred passing FERC-approved wholesale rates through to 
customers.166  It also reasoned that conflict-preemption analysis reinforces a 
finding of field preemption, because in its view the Maryland scheme 
presents a “direct and transparent impediment to the functioning of the PJM 
markets.”167 
New Jersey, another state in PJM, with some of the highest power prices 
in the country, adopted a similar set of incentives for new generators, known 
as its Long-Term Capacity Agreement Pilot Program.168  These incentives 
offered contracts to provide new electric generators fifteen years of revenue 
from local utilities, which would be passed through to local ratepayers.169  As 
with the Maryland scheme, New Jersey’s incentives resulted in a lawsuit by 
competitors and a district court judgment in favor of the plaintiffs finding 
conflict preemption.170  The Third Circuit, in a panel decision written by 
Judge Julio Fuente, agreed with this result, and couched its decision in a field-
preemption analysis.171  It noted that its decision is limited to “capacity 
prices” in an “exclusively federal field” and does not speak to the issue of 
conflict preemption.172  Despite the Third Circuit’s claim that capacity is 
exclusively within the sphere of federal authority, it also mysteriously notes 
that states still “may select the type of generation to be built[:] wind or solar, 
 
163. Id. at 476. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. (citing Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988); 
Nantahala, 476 U.S. 953). 
167. Id. at 479–80.  However, the court also suggested that its conflict preemption holding is 
narrow and “not every state regulation that incidentally affects federal markets is preempted.”  Id. 
at 479. 
168. Everest Schmidt, Note, A Call for Federalism: The Role of State Government in Federally 
Controlled Energy Markets, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 573, 591–92 (2013). 
169. Id. at 598–600. 
170. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d on other 
grounds sub nom. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014). 
171. PPL EnergyPlus, 766 F.3d at 255. 
172. Id. at 254. 
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gas or coal” and that “states may elect to build no electric generation facilities 
at all.”173 
Much like the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of FERC’s demand response 
regulations, these appellate court cases strongly embrace the traditional dual 
sovereignty paradigm for resolving federalism issues under the FPA.  They 
both fixate on a jurisdictional bright line under the FPA and characterize 
FERC’s jurisdiction over interstate wholesale markets as “plenary” and, in 
effect, exclusive.  Their reasoning relies on an expansive notion of field 
preemption even where the agency itself did not make any transparent finding 
in a regulatory proceeding that the state incentives are discriminatory in 
nature—a point I return to below.174  As Robert Nordhaus observes (in 
criticizing the approach of the Third Circuit), “These cases are significant 
because they go far beyond excluding ‘subsidized’ resources from capacity 
markets—they bar their construction and operation altogether.”175  In its 2016 
Hughes decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion 
that Maryland’s incentives are preempted, but, as I discuss below, this case 
and other recent decisions by the Court call into question whether a bright-
line approach to jurisdiction can resolve the federalism disputes confronting 
modern energy markets.176 
III. The Recent Rise of Concurrent Jurisdiction 
Dual sovereignty has continued to create uncertainty and confusion 
surrounding energy federalism in modern energy markets, calling into 
question its ability to promote uniformity and certainty.  This Part explores 
how recent Supreme Court decisions reject dual sovereignty as the organizing 
principle for energy federalism.  These recent decisions endorse statutory 
authorization for concurrent jurisdiction as the presumptive starting place for 
addressing many federalism disputes in modern energy markets.  Contrary to 
 
173. Id. at 255.  Although the court did not cite to the FPA as a basis for distinguishing between 
incentives that are explicit and those that indirectly result from generation mandates, it appears to 
be referencing a portion of the FPA that indicates that states, not the federal government, regulates 
the generation of electricity.  Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. 838, 847 
(1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012)); see PPL EnergyPlus, 766 F.3d at 
255. 
174. See infra section IV(C)(3). 
175. Nordhaus, supra note 3, at 211. 
176. Highlighting the significance of field preemption to these cases, the Solicitor General’s 
invited brief opposing certiorari cited Kurns v. Railroad Friction Product Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 
(2012).  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 
136 S. Ct. 1288 (Nos. 14-614, 14-623).  In Kurns, the Court found field preemption based on Justice 
Brandeis’s Napier opinion.  Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1264 (citing Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. 
Comm’n., 272 U.S. 605 (1926)).  However, in upholding the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court did 
not rely on this sweeping form of field-preemption analysis, which would preclude any state 
regulation at all of the issue.  Instead, it recognized that the problem was Maryland’s disregard for 
an interstate wholesale rate approved by FERC.  Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.  For further discussion, 
see infra section IV(C)(1). 
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objections raised by Justice Scalia, the decline of the bright-line approach 
and rise of concurrent jurisdiction is not inconsistent with the text and history 
of energy statutes, and case law construing energy statutes. 
A. Dual Sovereignty’s Crumbling Foundation 
The Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in New York v. FERC, upholding 
FERC’s landmark electric-power-market restructuring rules, provided the 
first sign that dual sovereignty was destined to fall.177  “Since 1935, and 
especially beginning in the 1970’s and 1980’s,” the Court observed, “the 
number of electricity suppliers has increased dramatically.”178  Many of these 
new entrants lacked access to transmission and thus faced anticompetitive 
conditions in interstate energy markets.179  In response to dysfunctional 
monopoly control of the industry and traditional rate regulation, in the 1990s 
FERC proposed a landmark set of rules to restructure the electric power 
industry (known collectively as Order No. 888), replacing cost-of-service 
regulation of wholesale utility sales.180  FERC’s rules proposed to 
“functionally unbundle[]” wholesale power sales from transmission and 
provide “equal access” to transmission lines through the filing of open-access 
tariffs with the agency.181 
Although Congress had addressed evolving conditions in the electric-
power industry on multiple occasions since 1935,182 FERC claimed it had 
jurisdiction to adopt Order No. 888 under the original language of sections 
205 and 206 of the FPA: “[T]he provisions concerning FERC’s power to 
remedy unduly discriminatory practices . . . .”183  After making a finding that 
utilities were discriminating in “bulk power markets,” in violation of section 
205 of the FPA, FERC invoked its authority to address 
“practice[s] . . . affecting” rates under section 206 to devise the remedy of 
open access.184  Below, the D.C. Circuit had upheld FERC’s factual findings 
of “a fundamental systemic problem in the industry.”185  FERC had 
recognized that the FPA’s “jurisdictional lines change” when retail energy 
products were broken into two different products, such as power supply and 
 
177. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
178. Id. at 7. 
179. Id. at 8–9, 9 n.6. 
180. Id. at 10–11. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 11. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 14 (quoting Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 683 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam)).  The Court also noted how FERC here was relying on a 
“marketwide” remedy similar to what it had used in restructuring the natural gas industry.  Id. (citing 
Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
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transmission.186  The Supreme Court agreed, adding that “the landscape of 
the electric industry has changed since the enactment of the FPA, when the 
electricity universe was ‘neatly divided into spheres of retail versus 
wholesale sales.’”187 
Of greater legal significance, the Court rejected the argument that Order 
No. 888 exceeds FERC’s authority because it reaches too far into a sphere of 
exclusive state authority.188  While FERC’s authority to unbundle wholesale 
transmission and sales and require open-access transmission is not without 
limit, the Court refused to apply a “presumption against pre-emption.”189  
Rather, the Court reasoned, the key question under the statute “is to examine 
the nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress to the agency.”190 
States challenging Order No. 888 quoted section 201(a)’s text, which 
provides that federal regulation is “to extend only to those matters which are 
not subject to regulation by the States.”191  However, as the Court’s 
precedents address, section 201(a) is a mere “policy declaration” that “cannot 
nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction, even if the particular grant 
seems inconsistent with the broadly expressed purpose.”192  This “prefatory” 
language, the Court reasoned, “does not undermine FERC’s jurisdiction.”193  
States also referenced section 201(b), which states that FERC has no 
jurisdiction “over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over 
facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric 
energy in intrastate commerce.”194  However, the Court reasoned that Order 
No. 888 did nothing to “even arguably” affect state jurisdiction over these 
things.195 
The FPA not only authorizes FERC to “close the gap in state power 
identified in Attleboro,” according to the Court, but also authorizes both “the 
regulation of wholesale sales that had been previously subject to state 
regulation” and the regulation of transmissions.196  
While “there is no language in the statute limiting FERC’s transmission 
jurisdiction to the wholesale market,” the Court observed that “the statute 
does limit FERC’s sale jurisdiction to that at wholesale.”197  Still, the Court 
 
186. Id. at 12. 
187. Id. at 16 (quoting Transmission Access, 255 F.3d at 691). 
188. Id. at 18–20. 
189. Id. at 17–19. 
190. Id. at 18 (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986)). 
191. Id. at 20 (quoting Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012))). 
192. Id. at 22 (quoting FPC v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964)). 
193. Id. 
194. Id. (quoting Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. at 847–48 (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012))). 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 21. 
197. Id. at 17. 
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rejected the argument that the FPA fixed jurisdiction based on the 
constitutional formalisms at the time of the statute’s enactment.  Rather, after 
this decision, the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction will depend on pragmatic 
concerns surrounding the operation of energy markets reflected in the 
agency’s factual and policy findings.  The FPA “extended federal coverage 
to some areas that previously had been state regulated,”198 but the Court also 
noted “Attleboro does not define the outer limits of the statute’s coverage.”199  
Referencing the “changes in the electricity industry that have occurred since 
the FPA was enacted in 1935,” the Court concluded that there “is no evidence 
that if Congress had foreseen the developments to which FERC has 
responded, Congress would have objected” to FERC Order No. 888.200 
B. Recognition of Concurrent Jurisdiction 
New York v. FERC reveals significant cracks in dual sovereignty’s 
foundational facts,201 but decisions from the Supreme Court’s past two terms 
reject dual sovereignty altogether as the organizing principle for addressing 
jurisdictional conflicts under energy statutes.  These decisions also recognize 
statutory authorization in both the NGA and FPA for concurrent regulation 
of many issues confronting modern energy markets, inviting federal and state 
regulators to coordinate their efforts in innovative federalism approaches. 
1. Justice Breyer’s ONEOK Opinion.—ONEOK v. Learjet, decided 
during the 2014 term, held that state antitrust suits aimed at pipeline price 
manipulation are not field preempted by the NGA.202  This case made its way 
 
198. Id. at 7. 
199. Id. at 21. 
200. Id. at 23.  Justice Thomas penned a dissent, which was joined by Justices Scalia and 
Kennedy.  Id. at 28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The dissent agreed FERC 
had jurisdiction under sections 205 and 206 of the FPA, id. at 28–29, but objected to other portions 
of the majority opinion because, in the views of the dissenters, FERC did not go far enough in 
regulating transmission.  See id. at 42 (disagreeing with the Court’s deference “to FERC’s decision 
not to regulate transmission connected to bundled retail sales” and instead favoring remand to FERC 
to explain whether there was discrimination in the marketplace requiring FERC to provide a remedy 
addressing “all transmission within its jurisdiction”). 
201. Suzanna Sherry insightfully observes: 
[T]he Supreme Court often structures and develops doctrine in ways that reflect its 
unstated assumptions about these foundational facts, and changes in these hidden 
factual assumptions may lead to unacknowledged changes in doctrine.  We can use the 
part we see—a sudden, unacknowledged, and apparently inexplicable change in 
doctrine—to uncover the foundational assumptions hidden within the doctrine. 
Sherry, supra note 7, at 184–85. 
202. ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1594 (2015).  Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion was joined by a somewhat unusual line-up: Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan.  Justice Thomas joined most of the majority opinion, especially its analysis of precedents 
under the NGA.  Id. at 1603 (Thomas, J., concurring).  He wrote separately, however, to underscore 
his longstanding view that implied preemption doctrine wanders from the Constitution.  Id.; see also 
Wyeth v. Levin, 555 U.S. 555, 582 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing Justice Thomas’s 
increasing skepticism about the Court’s implied preemption doctrine). 
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to the Supreme Court following several state antitrust lawsuits brought by 
retail buyers of natural gas, alleging that gas traders manipulated prices by 
reporting false information to private price-index publishers and engaging in 
wash trades.203  It presented a thorny legal question because the alleged 
market manipulation affected both wholesale sales—the traditional purview 
of federal regulators—and retail sales—which FERC is not authorized to 
regulate.204 
A core legal issue presented to the Supreme Court in ONEOK is 
whether, in adopting the NGA, Congress intended to “occupy the field” of 
antitrust remedies concerning pipelines’ pricing behavior in natural-gas 
markets.205  The Ninth Circuit had found no preemption, construing the scope 
of federal jurisdiction under the NGA narrowly and allowing the state law 
antitrust claims to proceed.206  Pipelines seeking review of this decision 
argued that the NGA preempts state antitrust-law challenges by retail 
customers to practices that also affect wholesale gas rates regulated by 
FERC.207 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the state law 
antitrust claims are not preempted and should be allowed to proceed.208  
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion emphasized that the NGA “was drawn with 
meticulous regard for the continued exercise of state power, not to handicap 
or dilute it in any way.”209  Under section 1(b) of the NGA, wholesale 
transactions fall squarely within the jurisdiction of federal regulators.210  For 
nearly seventy years, judicial precedents have reaffirmed the sharp clarity of 
this federal–state division of authority over wholesale and retail sales, 
sometimes even calling it a jurisdictional bright line.211  Yet the majority also 
distinguished a number of previous cases finding field preemption under the 
NGA, repeatedly emphasizing that Congress did not intend to dilute 
altogether state regulatory power and that such a finding should only be made 
“where detailed examination convinces us that a matter falls within the pre-
empted field as defined by our precedents.”212  As the majority reasoned, 
Congress has consistently favored competitive natural-gas markets, and 
states also have a long history of providing “common-law and statutory 
 
203. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1597–98 (2015) (majority opinion). 
204. Id. at 1594. 
205. Id. at 1595. 
206. Id. at 1599. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 1594. 
209. Id. at 1599 (quoting Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 517–
18 (1947)). 
210. Id. at 1596; Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821, 821 (1938) (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2012)). 
211. Id. at 1607 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 
476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986)). 
212. Id. at 1599 (majority opinion). 
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remedies against monopolies and unfair business practices” that reinforce 
these markets.213 
Indeed, in ONEOK, the majority questioned whether the NGA contains 
a strict dividing line at all: “Petitioners and the dissent argue that there is, or 
should be, a clear division between areas of state and federal authority in 
natural-gas regulation.  But that Platonic ideal does not describe the natural 
gas regulatory world.”214  The majority emphasized too that, despite the 
Solicitor General supporting the pipelines’ preemption arguments, FERC had 
not made an agency determination that field preemption would bar the 
antitrust claims.215  Accordingly no deference to the agency was due.216  In 
upholding the Ninth Circuit, the majority left any questions regarding conflict 
preemption of state antitrust regulation to be resolved by lower courts.217 
ONEOK stops well clear of finding field preemption of state regulation, 
contrasting with the result of Schneidewind.218  In rejecting the “forceful” 
argument of the pipelines that exclusive federal jurisdiction should control,219 
the majority reveals its reluctance to extend a preemptive effect to those 
transactions that are not purely wholesale.  Section 5(a) of the NGA 
authorizes FERC to also address practices affecting wholesale rates, while 
the statute also recognizes that retail sales are primarily in the purview of the 
states.220  The difficult question this case presented was what to do when a 
practice affects both types of sales.  Justice Breyer’s majority opinion 
provided a test for evaluating when state law will cross impermissibly into 
the sphere of federal regulation: courts must consider “the target at which the 
state law aims in determining whether [the] law is pre-empted.”221  With the 
particular antitrust claims at issue in this case, however, the state regulation 
was primarily aimed at practices “affecting” retail rates, so the majority 
reasoned that it was “firmly on the States’ side of that dividing line.”222 
ONEOK is significant for broader debates surrounding energy 
federalism.  It rejects dual sovereignty as the organizing principle for 
addressing jurisdictional issues under the NGA.  In some ways the majority’s 
test for preemption—which focuses on the federal regulatory target at which 
state law is aiming—takes inspiration from and is entirely consistent with 
 
213. Id. at 1601 (quoting California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989)). 
214. Id. at 1601 (citations omitted). 
215. Id. at 1602. 
216. Id. at 1602–03. 
217. Id. at 1595, 1603. 
218. See supra subpart II(B). 
219. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599. 
220. Id.; Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 5(a), 52 Stat. 821, 823 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 717d (2012)). 
221. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599. 
222. Id. at 1600 (quoting Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n 489 U.S. 493, 514 
(1989)). 
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Schneidewind’s attention to specific facts surrounding the tension between 
federal and state regulation.223  Yet, unlike the Court’s previous energy 
preemption precedents, ONEOK does not ground this analysis in a field 
preemption framework.  Rather, by calling into question whether field 
preemption doctrine is necessary or desirable in approaching preemption 
under the NGA, the majority’s decision endorses concurrent state regulation 
of anticompetitive conduct in interstate gas markets. 
2. Justice Kagan’s EPSA Opinion.—While ONEOK strongly endorsed 
state antitrust regulation of energy markets, the Supreme Court’s decision last 
term in EPSA embraced expansive federal authority over wholesale energy 
markets.  This pathbreaking decision upheld FERC’s rules for demand 
response compensation in wholesale energy markets.224  Instead of grounding 
its analysis in the field preemption framework of previous precedents, EPSA 
squarely rejected the dual sovereignty approach, which the D.C. Circuit had 
applied below to hold FERC’s demand response rules ultra vires under the 
FPA.225  “We will not read the FPA, against its clear terms,” the majority 
reasoned, “to halt a practice that so evidently enables the Commission to 
fulfill its statutory duties of holding down prices and enhancing reliability in 
the wholesale energy market.”226 
Without doubt, EPSA will prove important for modern energy 
markets.227  It definitively emboldens federal authorities to regulate a broad 
range of issues confronting energy markets.  These include initiatives to 
promote clean energy, as the environmental community celebrated 
 
223. See supra subpart II(B). 
224. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 784 (2016).  This 6–2 lineup 
was also somewhat unusual.  Id. at 765.  Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion, which was joined 
by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor.  Id.  As 
discussed below, Justice Scalia wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justice Thomas.  Id. at 784.  
Justice Alito did not participate in review of the case or the decision.  Id. 
225. See supra subpart II(C). 
226. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 782.  The Court upheld FERC’s demand regulations against an 
arbitrary and capricious attack, reversing the second ground for the D.C. Circuit’s opinion on this 
ground as well.  Id. at 784. 
227. A number of published articles already contain careful analysis of the decision’s 
implications.  See, e.g., Matthew R. Christiansen, FERC v. EPSA: Functionalism and the Electricity 
Industry of the Future, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 100, 100, 102 (2016) (speculating that EPSA “may 
ultimately rank among the most significant energy law cases of all time” and that it may “provide a 
solid foundation for similarly functionalist and pragmatic approaches to adapting electricity 
regulation to the changing electricity sector”); Eisen, supra note 60, at 1787–88 (emphasizing how 
EPSA clarifies the expansive nature of FERC’s authority over practices affecting wholesale rates); 
González, supra note 21, at 1429 (observing that the Court endorsed a functionalist approach in 
EPSA).  For a discussion of the Court’s decision and its implications for state clean-energy policies, 
grid-edge innovation, and agency deference, see Symposium, FERC v. EPSA Symposium, 40 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 1 (2016). 
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immediately after this decision was issued.228  However, EPSA is also 
significant because it resoundingly rejects dual sovereignty as the primary 
framework for addressing important jurisdictional issues in modern energy 
markets.  Rather than beginning its jurisdictional analysis with the traditional 
bright-line approach, the majority focused on the pragmatic challenges FERC 
faces given its policies to restructure the electric-power industry by 
enhancing competition and its ongoing statutory obligation to ensure “just 
and reasonable” rates.229  The decision emphasized, in particular, the serious 
problem presented by electricity’s inability to be stored and the need to 
coordinate the supply and demand of energy on the grid in real time.230  It 
also noted “the wholesale electric market lacks the self-correcting 
mechanism of other markets.”231  The majority recognized that the “statutory 
division” between wholesale and retail sales “generates a steady flow of 
jurisdictional disputes because—in point of fact if not of law—the wholesale 
and retail markets in electricity are inextricably linked.”232 
Apart from its heavy reliance on changing foundational facts that 
support the agency’s claim to jurisdiction, three analytical aspects of EPSA’s 
reasoning stand out as especially important for future energy federalism 
disputes.  First, the Supreme Court placed its initial (and primary) analytical 
focus on establishing whether FERC has jurisdiction, using the established 
test that a practice must “directly affect” wholesale markets.233  Second, 
EPSA clarified that the FPA does not authorize direct federal regulation of 
retail rates, but this is not a realm of authority that is exclusively reserved for 
states.234  Third, the majority recognized the importance of state 
 
228. See, e.g., Darius Dixon, Supreme Court Backs Federal Authority in Power Saving Rule, 
POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/01/supreme-court-backs-electricity-
saving-rule-218182 [https://perma.cc/643Y-HTUD] (quoting Environmental Defense Fund 
President Fred Krup, who said, “[t]oday’s Supreme Court decision is a victory for all Americans 
who want greater choice and value broader customer access to clean, low-cost energy” and Allison 
Clements of the Natural Resources Defense Council, who said the decision is key “because demand 
response is flexible and fast-acting, it enables the affordable integration of more wind and solar 
power into the electricity transmission grid”). 
229. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767–68.  FERC initiated these policies in Order 888, as the Court 
addressed in New York v. FERC.  See supra subpart III(A).  EPSA notes that FERC’s primary 
strategy for ensuring just and reasonable rates has been “to break down regulatory and economic 
barriers that hinder a free market in wholesale electricity.”  EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 768 (quoting Morgan 
Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 536 (2008)). 
230. Id. at 768. 
231. Id. at 769. 
232. Id. at 766. 
233. Id. at 773. 
234. See id. at 777–79 (conceding that FERC may not “set” retail rates but that it may impose 
regulations that change consumer incentives). 
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experimentation in approaching retail customer demand response.235  I 
address each of these in turn. 
After describing the practical problem FERC confronts in regulating 
interstate energy markets, the Supreme Court began its jurisdictional analysis 
in a fundamentally different manner than the D.C. Circuit.  It did not fixate 
on a static sphere of sovereignty reserved to the states; instead it first assessed 
whether the FPA authorizes FERC to regulate demand response in interstate 
markets even though it is not a wholesale energy sale.236  Although the 
majority recognized that FERC’s reliance on remedial 
“practices . . . affecting” jurisdiction potentially might “extend FERC’s 
power to some surprising places,” it also endorsed a common sense judicial 
test that limits FERC’s jurisdiction to rules or practices that “directly affect 
the [wholesale] rate.”237  Highlighting FERC’s findings and policy rationales 
regarding how demand response can bring down wholesale energy prices, 
EPSA reasoned that FERC’s rules regulating wholesale demand response 
meet this standard “with room to spare.”238 
EPSA also sheds light on the limited extent to which provisions of the 
FPA reserve exclusive state powers.  Section 201(a), which states that federal 
regulation of electricity “extend[s] only to those matters which are not subject 
to regulation by the States,” does not, in the view of the majority, provide 
state regulation any legal protection from federal intrusion.239  Rather, 
consistent with past cases, EPSA treats section 201(a) as “merely a ‘policy 
declaration . . . of great generality’” that only points towards the state 
authority reserved by section 201(b) over retail sales and specific facilities.240 
The Supreme Court also reasoned that “a FERC regulation does not run 
afoul” of section 201(b)’s prohibition “just because it affects—even 
substantially—the quantity or terms of retail sales.”241  Again appealing to 
pragmatism, the majority emphasized how “transactions that occur on the 
wholesale market have natural consequences at the retail level.”242  
Methodologically, EPSA’s approach suggests that the assessment of 
federalism disputes must begin with an analysis of FERC’s authority: “When 
 
235. See id. at 779–80 (concluding that FERC’s provision of a state veto over “effective” 
increases in retail rates produced by federal demand response programs constitutes a “program of 
cooperative federalism”). 
236. See id. at 772–73 (describing the D.C. Circuit’s bright-line approach in the case below and 
outlining the steps in the Supreme Court’s analysis). 
237. Id. at 774 (quoting Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 403 (D.C. Cir. 
2004)). 
238. Id. 
239. Id. at 775 n.6; Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012)). 
240. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 775 n.6 (quoting FPC v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964) 
(quoting Conn. Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515, 527 (1945))). 
241. Id. at 776. 
242. Id. 
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FERC regulates what takes place on the wholesale market, as part of carrying 
out its charge to improve how that market runs, then no matter the effect on 
retail rates [section 201(b) of the FPA] imposes no bar.”243  After deciding 
that FERC has remedial authority under the statute to issue the demand 
response rules, the majority seems to presumptively favor FERC exercising 
its jurisdiction, including concurrently. 
This does not, however, mean that FERC can regulate without any 
limits.  Section 201(b)’s language states that the provisions of the FPA do not 
apply to “any other sale of electric energy” (other than wholesale sales).244  
Contrary to the view of the D.C. Circuit below, this does not create exclusive 
state jurisdiction.  Instead, this provision only recognizes that the FPA (in its 
plain terms) does not authorize FERC to regulate “any other sale.”  For 
example, this would seem to suggest that FERC cannot directly regulate retail 
sales or set retail rates.245  But, in regulating wholesale markets there is 
nothing in the FPA that precludes FERC’s regulation of wholesale markets 
from having an effect on retail rates or on the quantity or terms of retail 
sales.246  It follows that the only reservation of exclusive authority for state 
regulators appears in the last sentence of section 201(b), which does not 
speak in terms of what FERC is authorized to do but instead states FERC 
“shall not have jurisdiction.”247  States, of course, still set retail rates (since 
FERC is simply not authorized to do this) and nothing about FERC’s demand 
response regulations directly regulates generation or distribution facilities, 
which are simply outside FERC’s jurisdiction under the FPA.248 
Finally, EPSA clearly indicates that the FPA’s allocation of federal–state 
authority allows for concurrent federal and state authority over the practices 
affecting rates and encourages state experimentation.  FERC’s regulation of 
demand response occurs against the backdrop of considerable variation in 
state-policy approaches regarding retail demand response and retail customer 
participation in the wholesale market.249  FERC’s demand response rule, the 
Court noted, “allows any State regulator to prohibit its consumers from 
making demand response bids in the wholesale market.”250  While FERC 
would appear to have the statutory power to negate these kinds of state policy 
 
243. Id. 
244. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012)). 
245. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 777–78. 
246. Id. at 776. 
247. Federal Power Act § 201(b) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)). 
248. Id. 
249. For a discussion of the various state schemes to facilitate demand response, see Stuart 
Schare & Brett Feldman, A New Era of Demand Response, POWER ENGINEERING (Aug. 21, 2015), 
http://www.power-eng.com/articles/print/volume-119/issue-8/features/a-new-era-of-demand-
response.html [https://perma.cc/8EUY-7FD4]. 
250. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 779. 
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decisions if they produced discrimination in interstate power markets,251 it 
chose not to exercise this authority.252  In effect, FERC allowed states an “opt 
out,” since any FERC regulation of demand response depends on the 
voluntary acquiescence of states.  According to the Supreme Court, “that veto 
gives States the means to block whatever ‘effective’ increases in retail rates 
demand response programs might be thought to produce.”253  This allows 
states to experiment with a wide range of approaches to promote energy 
conservation, including allowing the states the option of prohibiting retail 
customers from making demand response bids into wholesale markets. 
This state experimentation may reinforce federal goals regarding 
wholesale power markets, but ultimately the participation in wholesale 
markets depends on the choices of customers and private firms.  In rejecting 
the D.C. Circuit’s novel claim that FERC’s demand response rule is ultra 
vires because it serves to “lure” retail customers into the wholesale market, 
at the very minimum EPSA endorses the basic principle (which FERC has 
applied elsewhere) that it is the customer’s choice to participate in wholesale 
energy markets that triggers FERC’s jurisdiction.254  Since demand response 
is a market-driven innovation, not something FERC created, its effects on the 
wholesale market and FERC’s reasons for regulating it will ultimately hinge 
on customer practices and choices.255 
C. Unsnarling Concurrent Jurisdiction’s Roots 
Justice Scalia’s ONEOK dissent critiques the majority for making a 
“snarl” out of the statute and judicial precedents.256  According to him, the 
Supreme Court’s longstanding precedents “draw a firm line between national 
and local authority,” while the majority “smudges this line.”257  In contrast to 
concurrent jurisdiction, Justice Scalia believed that the FPA contains a 
“bright line easily ascertained” that makes unnecessary a case-by-case 
assessment of facts related to jurisdiction.258  He saw the ONEOK majority’s 
“make-it-up-as-you-go-along” approach to preemption259 as unduly fixating 
on the purposes or aims (or why) rather than what the state regulates.260  
Justice Scalia also found the prospect of multiple antitrust standards in 
 
251. See infra subpart IV(B). 
252. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 779. 
253. Id. at 779–80. 
254. Id. at 778–79. 
255. Id. 
256. ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1606 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
257. Id. at 1603. 
258. Id. at 1607 (quoting Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 
(1986)). 
259. Id. at 1603. 
260. Id. at 1606. 
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natural-gas markets “unworkable.”261  “From now on,” he stated, “pipelines 
will have to ensure that their behavior conforms to the discordant regulations 
of fifty States—or more accurately, to the discordant verdicts of untold state 
antitrust juries.”262 
His dissent in EPSA—the last dissent he authored—shows perhaps less 
vigor but no less conviction.  Justice Scalia would have upheld the D.C. 
Circuit decision finding FERC’s demand response rules ultra vires under the 
FPA.263  The EPSA majority and dissent diverge not only in their conclusions 
but also in their basic approaches to interpreting the statute: Justice Scalia 
would begin by examining whether the statute forecloses federal regulation 
by reserving state authority, while (at least in his view) the majority flips the 
presumption under the statute to favor FERC, rather than states.264  According 
to Justice Scalia, whether the statute leaves a regulatory gap “depends on 
what it says and not on what its proponents hoped to achieve.”265  He also 
raises a concern that the majority’s emphasis on the statutory objective of 
closing regulatory gaps results in an “extravagant and otherwise-unheard-of 
method for establishing regulatory jurisdiction.”266 
It is no surprise to see Justice Scalia dissent from these recent decisions, 
given his partiality for bright-line rules.267  But despite Justice Scalia’s 
hyperbole, the dual sovereignty approach to jurisdiction is not required by 
the language or the structure of energy statutes, and an alternative approach 
need not produce a statutory “snarl.” 
 
261. Id. at 1603. 
262. Id. at 1608.  It may be somewhat surprising to see Justice Scalia supporting more federal 
regulatory power here—especially given his strident dissent in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (2012) (striking down portions of Arizona’s immigration law on preemption grounds); see id. 
at 2511 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (objecting to the majority’s opinion on 
the grounds that it “deprives States of what most would consider the defining characteristic of 
sovereignty”).  He, however, also seems squarely committed to uniform national regulation of 
competitive markets under federal statutes.  Justice Scalia’s concerns about nonuniform regulation 
of gas markets echo Justice Alito’s dissent, with which Justice Scalia joined, in Wyeth v. Levine, 
555 U.S. 555, 604 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
263. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 789 (2016) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
264. See id. at 785 (“While the majority would find every sale of electric energy to be within 
FERC’s authority to regulate unless the transaction is demonstrably a retail sale, the statute actually 
excludes from FERC’s jurisdiction all sales of electric energy except those that are demonstrably 
sales at wholesale.”). 
265. Id. at 788. 
266. Id. 
267. See Gluck, supra note 20, at 2042–43 (“Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and even Chief 
Justice Roberts have been more willing to see the federalism inside federal statutes than have more 
textualist Justices like Justice Scalia, even though textualist judges have often been more federalist.  
Justice Scalia wants clear direction and bright lines—a desire incompatible with a Congress that 
legislates with gaps for administrative flexibility and that utilizes states in varied ways across 
different statutes.” (footnote omitted)). 
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It is helpful to begin—as would Justice Scalia—with the text of the 
NGA and the FPA.  While these statutes speak to comprehensive federal 
authority and provide powerful tools to federal regulators, these provisions 
state only that federal law “shall apply to” certain transactions.268  They do 
not use terms like “exclusive” or “preemptive” to describe federal regulatory 
jurisdiction.  Thus, if federal law preempts state regulations it is because of 
some form of implied preemption—such as the approach of Napier269—not 
because of the explicit text of the NGA and the FPA.  The structure of the 
statute, moreover, hardly incorporates a robust conception of state 
sovereignty.  The otherwise-expansive authority granted by the NGA and the 
FPA is subject to an external constraint: state regulators have very-limited-
but-exclusive authority over specific energy facilities.270  EPSA’s discussion 
of section 201 of the FPA illustrates this point: “The above conclusion [that 
FERC’s rules governing wholesale demand response directly affect 
wholesale rates] does not end our inquiry into the Commission’s statutory 
authority; to uphold the Rule, we also must determine that it does not regulate 
retail electricity sales.”271  There is thus nothing in either the text or structure 
of the FPA that requires dual sovereignty’s bright-line approach to 
jurisdiction. 
Perhaps the strongest rationale supported by history for recognizing a 
sharp jurisdictional division of power in these energy statutes is that this 
formalistic view of the Commerce Clause produced Attleboro and its gap,272 
and that this constitutional doctrine was thus an assumption against which 
Congress was legislating in the 1930s.  This argument that New Deal-era 
energy statutes locked in an antiquated constitutional-federalism principle by 
simple virtue of adoption (with no other mention in the statute), however, 
was rejected in New York v. FERC.273  It is also inconsistent with the Court’s 
 
268. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821, 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 717(b) (2012)) (“The provisions of this Act shall apply to the transportation of natural gas 
in interstate commerce . . . .”); Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. 838, 847 
(1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012)) (“The provisions of this Part shall 
apply to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of energy at 
wholesale in interstate commerce . . . .”). 
269. See supra subpart II(A). 
270. Natural Gas Act § 1(b), 52 Stat. at 821 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717(b)) (“The 
provisions of this Act . . . shall not apply to . . . the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities 
used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.”); Federal Power Act, ch. 
687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. at 848 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)) (“[FERC] 
shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically provided . . . over facilities used for the generation 
of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only the transmission of electric 
energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed 
wholly by the transmitter.”). 
271. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 775. 
272. See supra subpart I(A) (discussing Attleboro); see generally Post, supra note 4 (noting 
how 1920s Commerce Clause jurisprudence was premised on dual sovereignty). 
273. See supra subpart III(A). 
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recent turn towards giving little weight to the “contemporary legal context” 
against which Congress legislated when interpreting statutes.274  It also would 
produce absurd results if used as a general interpretative principle in 
approaching energy statutes.  For example, such an approach would also 
require modern courts to use the Lochner275-era cases such as Smyth v. 
Ames276 in addressing the rate-setting authority of agencies under 
communications and energy statutes adopted during the New Deal era, rather 
than the later, more deferential approach that courts have consistently favored 
for more than half a century.277  Absent some language to the contrary, 
statutes simply do not freeze in place existing constitutional doctrines as 
interpretive tools.  
Nor is it “unheard” of to suggest that New Deal-era statutes authorize 
some concurrent jurisdiction in the regulation of energy markets.  These 
statutes clearly envision state regulation continuing against the backdrop of 
comprehensive (but not exclusive) federal authority.  In the legislative history 
surrounding adoption of these statutes, Congress envisioned overlapping 
jurisdiction.  A number of the Court’s precedents also give the lie to dual 
sovereignty’s nirvana-like fallacy that energy markets ever adhered to a static 
jurisdictional bright line based on legal formalisms.  In terms of the statutes 
and case law, the majorities in ONEOK and EPSA are thus correct in 
beginning with an assessment of FERC’s jurisdiction.  The conclusions that 
these statutes also authorize concurrent jurisdiction over a considerable range 
of activities, rather than require dual sovereignty, is not without historical 
basis.278 
The history surrounding the FPA’s enactment contains numerous 
statements showing that its supporting legislators understood the expansion 
 
274. This interpretative principle is most clearly illustrated by the Court’s implied-right-of-
action cases.  In Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), the Court held that private individuals 
may not sue to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.  Id. at 278.  When asked to interpret Title VI according to the interpretive principle 
prevalent at the time of the statute’s enactment, the Court declined.  Id. at 287–88.  Justice Scalia, 
writing for the Court, distinguished several prior implied-right-of-action cases, concluding that the 
Court had “never accorded dispositive weight to context shorn of text.  In determining whether 
statutes create private rights of action, as in interpreting statutes generally, legal context matters 
only to the extent it clarifies text.”  Id. at 288 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
275. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
276. 169 U.S. 466, 545–49 (1898) (adopting reproduction cost as a constitutionally required 
approach to setting rates in order to protect railroad and utility investors).  The Supreme Court 
overruled this approach in the 1940s.  See FPC v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 627 (1944); 
FPC v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 602 (1942) (Black, Douglas, Murphy, JJ., concurring). 
277. For discussion of this since-repudiated approach to constitutional protection of property in 
utility regulation, see generally Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from 
the Controversy Over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187 (1984). 
278. Of course, a statute may affirmatively identify specific activities as outside of FERC’s 
reach, but, as the Court makes clear in EPSA, the only activities reserved exclusively for states under 
the FPA are the facilities listed in the last sentence of § 201(b).  See supra note 244 and 
accompanying text. 
ROSSI.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2016  11:08 AM 
2016] The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism 441 
of federal authority as an overlay onto existing state regulatory power, not as 
replacing it.  The Report of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce 
that accompanied the bill that would become the FPA states that 
“[s]ubsection (a) . . . declares the policy of Congress to extend that regulation 
to those matters which cannot be regulated by the States and to assist the 
States in the exercise of their regulatory powers.”279  The House Committee 
Report accompanying that same piece of legislation states: “The bill . . . 
contains provisions authorizing the Federal Commission to aid the State 
commissions in their efforts to ascertain and fix reasonable charges.”280  That 
Report also notes that: “The new parts are so drawn as to be a complement 
to and in no sense a usurpation of State regulatory authority . . . .”281 
In addition, earlier in consideration of the proposed legislation, then-
FPC Commissioner Clyde Seavey testified in support of creating federal 
jurisdiction over interstate power markets before the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce.282  He stated that the proposed legislation 
“is designed to secure coordination on a regional scale of the Nation’s power 
resources and to fill the gap in the present State regulation of electric 
utilities.”283  And he further elaborated, “[i]t is conceived entirely as a 
supplement to, and not a substitute for State regulation.”284 
This legislative history clearly envisions a continuing role for state 
regulation, and some of the Court’s earliest decisions also call into question 
whether dual sovereignty is required by the statute.  One of the earliest 
preemption cases under the NGA noted that the jurisdictional inquiry  
has been less concerned to find a point in time and space where the 
interstate commerce in gas ends and intrastate commerce begins, and 
has looked to the nature of the state regulation involved, the objective 
of the state, and the effect of the regulation upon the national interest 
in the commerce.285   
In the first decade following the enactment of the FPA, the Court also 
observed that under the statute “[f]ederal jurisdiction was to follow the flow 
of electric energy, an engineering and scientific, rather than a legalistic or 
governmental, test.”286 
Despite the shadow that dual sovereignty cast over such interpretations, 
courts also have a long tradition of construing the scope of FERC’s authority 
 
279. S. REP. NO. 74-621, at 48 (1935). 
280. H.R. REP. NO. 74-1318, at 8 (1935). 
281. Id. 
282. House Hearings, supra note 47, at 384, 392 (statement of FPC Commissioner Clyde 
Seavey in support of original bill). 
283. Id. at 384. 
284. Id. 
285. Ill. Nat. Gas Co. v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498, 505 (1942). 
286. Conn. Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515, 529 (1945). 
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under these statutes to prioritize the purpose of allowing federal law to fill 
regulatory gaps presented by energy markets.287  As the Court stated in 1961: 
[W]hen a dispute arises over whether a given transaction is within the 
scope of federal or state regulatory authority, we are not inclined to 
approach the problem negatively, thus raising the possibility that a “no 
man’s land” will be created.  That is to say, in a borderline case where 
congressional authority is not explicit we must ask whether state 
authority can practicably regulate a given area and, if we find that it 
cannot, then we are impelled to decide that federal authority 
governs.288 
Justice Stevens’s 2002 opinion for the Court in New York v. FERC 
suggests that, methodologically, this analysis must begin with an assessment 
of “the nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress to the agency,” 
rather than with a fixed sphere of state sovereignty.289  
Finally, though there is little doubt that federal authority over interstate 
energy markets is comprehensive, the idea that it is exclusive is a judicial 
construction, not anything that is required by the statute itself.  A long line of 
cases rejects the idea of exclusive federal jurisdiction over wholesale markets 
or exclusive state jurisdiction even where federal regulation has a substantial 
effect on retail rates or retail energy sales.  For example, the Court has stated 
that “once a company is properly found to be a ‘public utility’ under the Act 
the fact that a local commission may also have regulatory power does not 
preclude exercise of the Commission’s functions.”290  Later decisions 
observe that the established authority of a state to regulate retail rates does 
not foreclose federal regulators from taking into account the same rates, even 
when federal regulation will ultimately affect retail rates.  As the Supreme 
Court states in FPC v. Conway Corp.,291 even though a federal regulator 
“lacks authority to fix rates for direct industrial sales, [it] may take those rates 
into consideration when it fixes the rates for interstate wholesale sales which 
are subject to its jurisdiction.”292 
Even Schneidewind, which embraces a bright line and dual sovereignty 
approach, acknowledged that any analytical approach to preemption that only 
examines the scope of federal jurisdiction will not, on its own terms, support 
 
287. As discussed above, this also has a strong grounding in the history surrounding the 
enactment of these statutes.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
288. FPC v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1961) (citation omitted). 
289. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18 (2002) (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 
U.S. 355, 374 (1986)). 
290. Conn. Power & Light Co., 324 U.S. at 533. 
291. 426 U.S. 271 (1976). 
292. Id. at 281–82 (quoting Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 635, 646 (1945)). 
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a conclusion that a state law is preempted.293  In applying field preemption, a 
court still needs to decide the scope of the field and apply this to state law.  
Courts thus cannot resolve a preemption question under the vacuum of 
federal law and its static definition of a sphere of federal authority without 
examining facts related to purposes.  For example, Schneidewind’s field 
preemption analysis was not based on Congress’s delegation to FERC but 
looked to the purposes of the state law as well as the nature of federal law in 
deciding whether a state regulatory action is within the scope of the field.294  
By its very nature, this kind of preemption analysis does not reason to its 
conclusion based on a predefined sphere of federal regulation, as the 
delegation analysis of Napier would suggest.295  Instead, this kind of 
preemption analysis requires analysis of how federal and state regulation of 
energy markets interact when they overlap.  Thus, even before ONEOK and 
EPSA, the Supreme Court appears to have recognized that state regulatory 
programs have the potential to serve as complements, rather than inherent 
impediments, to federal regulation of energy markets. 
IV. New Challenges for Energy Federalism(s) 
It is easy to get lost in the weeds of energy federalism, especially to the 
extent courts have traditionally fixated on a formalistic bright-line approach 
or tried to define exclusive jurisdiction for various activities.  In the end, 
however, as the Supreme Court recognized in its 2016 EPSA opinion, these 
jurisdictional disputes always circle back to one overarching principle: no 
one, not even those who advocate for field preemption, disputes that the 
primary purposes behind New Deal-era energy statutes is to close general 
regulatory gaps.296 
The traditional bright-line approach is based on the premise that these 
statutes prohibit federal–state jurisdictional overlaps.  However, as I have 
argued, outside of a few very specific statutory provisions that speak clearly 
to foreclose federal regulation of particular facilities or transactions, there is 
nothing in the legislative history, text, structure, or purpose of these statutes 
that requires a dual sovereignty approach.  Applying a presumption in favor 
of these statutes authorizing concurrent federal–state jurisdiction over energy 
markets not only recognizes extensive federal authority over interstate energy 
markets.  It also leaves states considerable authority to craft their own energy-
resource policies by fundamentally redefining energy-federalism disputes as 
political and policy questions, not as formalistic legal ones. 
 
293. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300–01 (1988) (confirming 
Congress’s power to implicitly indicate an “intent to occupy a given field to the exclusion of state 
law” in the absence of explicit statutory language). 
294. See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text. 
295. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. 
296. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). 
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But concurrent jurisdiction is hardly neat and tidy.  The Supreme 
Court’s recognition of concurrent jurisdiction leaves many questions 
unanswered and is certain to motivate new jurisdictional challenges 
regarding the scope of both federal and state regulatory authority.297  In 
contrast to dual sovereignty, concurrent jurisdiction requires regulators and 
courts to be more attentive to the core purposes behind energy statutes as they 
address modern market disputes—a fundamental insight that could help to 
bring a principled resolution to some current issues pending before courts 
involving state incentives for power-generation capacity.  EPSA highlights 
the value of state experimentation, yet it also recognizes that it is ultimately 
FERC that possesses a powerful range of federalism possibilities to aid its 
regulatory approach for modern power markets.  But how far can these state 
initiatives go, and when will they be preempted? 
The Supreme Court has recently provided part of the answer in Hughes, 
which concluded that Maryland’s incentives to encourage new natural-gas 
plants interfered with FERC’s regulation of the wholesale market under the 
FPA.298  Hughes favors a preemption conclusion for certain state initiatives 
that conflict with federally approved wholesale-market energy prices, but its 
holding is narrow.  As I argue below, the decision does not reject concurrent 
jurisdiction in the regulation of wholesale energy markets and envisions 
continued leeway for state energy resource subsidies and incentives—
especially for energy-supply attributes that FERC-approved rates do not price 
in the wholesale market.  However, if courts do not approach these issues 
carefully, they risk converting Hughes’s into a sweeping application of field 
preemption, which would be inconsistent with a concurrent jurisdiction in 
energy federalism.  This would be a mistake.  In order for regulatory 
federalism to evolve and to adapt to modern energy markets, it will be 
necessary for courts to carefully approach some of the precedents and 
remaining doctrinal relics of dual sovereignty, especially after Hughes. 
They can start by eliminating use of judicial field preemption with 
regards to “practices. . .affecting” rates language in energy statutes.  Courts 
should instead review FERC’s actual regulatory decisions, including agency 
determinations of jurisdictional facts and policy rationales, and employ 
conflict-preemption principles while doing so.  In addition, while concurrent 
jurisdiction still contains some meaningful limits on federal authority under 
energy statutes, these are primarily grounded in pragmatic agency law and 
policy findings, not some predefined notion of state sovereignty or judicial 
precedents that fix the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction. 
 
297. See Joel B. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, 40 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. F. 1, 9 (2016) (arguing the decision in EPSA left many questions unanswered 
including the extent to which states can regulate electricity if their laws impact wholesale markets). 
298. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1291–92 (2016). 
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As I also discuss below, clarification of FERC’s role in making 
preemption determinations can help to enhance the transparency and 
accountability, while also allowing regulators to better adapt their approaches 
to evolving new issues in energy markets.  Judicial clarification of these 
issues can help to encourage more creative federal–state collaborations, leave 
considerable space for state experimentation, and simplify and make more 
predictable preemption analyses. 
A. Avoiding a Regulatory “No Man’s Land” 
The Supreme Court’s 2016 EPSA decision illustrates how a federalism 
approach premised on concurrent jurisdiction—rather than bright-line 
jurisdiction—can often better advance the primary purpose of energy statutes 
in modern energy markets.  Apart from the very clauses in these statutes, 
there is no evidence that it also was aiming to give similar weight to avoiding 
all federal–state jurisdictional overlaps.  And there is no evidence whatsoever 
that Congress intended to endorse a single federalism principle—dual 
sovereignty or otherwise—to govern regulation of energy markets. 
Rather, the core objectives of the FPA and NGA are to close regulatory 
gaps.  There is little doubt that in adopting these statutes Congress was aiming 
to address the Attleboro gap.299  This gap is not permanently fixed by law.  
Instead, it is the byproduct of energy-market conditions coupled with federal 
and state regulatory efforts.  If states are unable to “practicably” regulate a 
certain area, it is appropriate to ask whether the statute gives FERC some 
substantive or remedial authority to address the conduct.300  Where state 
regulation results in a regulatory “no man’s land,” the Supreme Court has 
recognized how federal regulation under the statute is appropriate.301 
Consistent with this historical expansion of federal authority, the 
Court’s 2016 EPSA decision upheld FERC’s authorization to adopt demand 
response rules for wholesale energy markets.  It is thus well established that 
the FPA allows broad federal jurisdiction over not only wholesale sales, but 
also “practices . . . affecting” sales—as a way of ensuring that there is no 
regulatory gap in power markets.302  In recognizing how demand response 
can “directly affect” wholesale markets, EPSA concluded that demand 
response is within the agency’s clear statutory authorization “with room to 
 
299. See supra subpart I(A). 
300. See FPC v. Transcon. Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1961) (“[W]here congressional 
authority is not explicit we must ask whether state authority can practicably regulate a given area 
and, if we find that it cannot, then we are impelled to decide that federal authority governs.”). 
301. Id. 
302. See Eisen, supra note 60, at 1845 (“If FERC could not oversee mechanisms that form the 
core of the wholesale markets, it would create the kind of regulatory gap that Congress sought to 
correct when it adopted the FPA in 1935.”). 
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spare.”303  It reasons that following the D.C. Circuit’s approach of excluding 
demand response from FERC’s jurisdiction would “prevent[] all use of a tool 
that no one . . . disputes will curb prices and enhance reliability in the 
wholesale electricity market.”304 
After finding FERC’s demand response rules to be clearly authorized 
and not prohibited under the statute, the Court addressed how the effect of 
the D.C. Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction 
would be to create a situation where no regulator—federal or state—would 
be able to address activities regarding demand response in wholesale power 
markets.  Under the D.C. Circuit approach “state commissions could not 
regulate demand response bids either.”305  But as the Court observed, this 
produces a problem: “If neither FERC nor the States can regulate wholesale 
demand response, then by definition no one can.  But under the Act, no 
electricity transaction can proceed unless it is regulable by someone. . . . 
Congress passed the FPA precisely to eliminate vacuums of authority over 
the electricity markets.”306 
In preventing the creation of “any” regulatory “no man’s land,” the 
Court further emphasized, “[t]he Act makes federal and state powers 
‘complementary’ and ‘comprehensive,’ so that ‘there [will] be no “gaps” for 
private interests to subvert the public welfare.”307  This same concern led 
Justice Kagan to press the lawyers for the appellee during oral argument.  As 
she stated then, if the D.C. Circuit opinion were upheld, “there would be a 
regulatory gap.”308  She elaborated, “[i]n other words, FERC can’t do 
anything nor can the States do anything.”309 
EPSA, however, should not be understood as only endorsing expansive 
federal authority to address regulatory gaps.  It is a mistake to think that any 
time FERC is authorized by statute to regulate an activity that this preempts 
any state regulation.  Even the Court’s decision in Hughes, which upheld 
federal preemption of Maryland’s incentives for new power-generation 
facilities given FERC’s approval of the PJM-capacity market,310 shows how 
an overly broad preemption analysis can produce the reverse effect.  
Categorically claiming broad comprehensive federal regulation, as with field 
preemption, may also in some instances produce a situation where both 
 
303. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).  As the Court notes, 
its determination is based on the clear language of the statute, not on any sort of deference to the 
agency.  Id. at 773 n.5. 
304. Id. at 773. 
305. Id. at 780. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. at 780 (quoting FPC v. La. Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 631 (1972)). 
308. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 
760 (2016) (No. 14-840). 
309. Id. 
310. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1291–92 (2016). 
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federal and state regulators are incapable of addressing conduct in modern 
energy markets. 
In writing for the majority in Hughes, Justice Ginsburg concluded: 
“We . . . need not and do not address the permissibility of various other 
measures States might employ to encourage development of new or clean 
generation, including tax incentives, land grants, direct subsidies, 
construction of state-owned generation facilities, or re-regulation of the 
energy sector.”311  In other words, the Court left open the question of whether 
in a future case many other state incentives for clean-energy generation will 
be preempted by federal regulation under the FPA.  A broad finding of federal 
preemption as preempting all state-generation incentives and subsidies would 
produce a “no man’s land” for many incentives affecting new, clean sources 
of energy.  To prevent creating this kind of regulatory void, courts should 
avoid excessively broad claims of exclusive jurisdiction based merely on 
whether a statute authorizes federal regulation without also addressing 
whether regulators have made a practicable commitment to exercising this 
authority to address energy-market activities.312 
Of course, field preemption under energy statutes has a long history in 
the context of utility-rate approvals.  Recall Nantahala, where the Court 
found that the tool of a utility-specific, cost-of-service rate approval 
preempted states from “trapping” wholesale costs.313  These ratemaking tools 
were largely self-implementing in individual rate cases, and to the extent that 
there was a risk of under- or overcompensation, both federal and state 
regulators were likely to have an opportunity to address this and apply the 
applicable rules.314  
Yet what may have seemed pragmatic for managing conflicts when both 
federal and state regulators were focused on setting rates simply does not 
serve a similar purpose in modern energy markets.  Dynamic modern energy 
markets challenge federal regulators to monitor and regulate transactions in 
a competitive industry rather than focusing on a monopolistic energy 
supplier’s costs.315  The ability of any regulator to effectively monitor and 
 
311. Id. at 1299. 
312. Although the Supreme Court in Hughes upheld the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that 
Maryland’s incentives were preempted, the Court’s analysis in reaching this conclusion does not 
echo the lower court’s reasoning, which relied on a sweeping categorical application of field 
preemption.  Id. at 1299; PPL Energy Plus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 474–77 (4th Cir. 2014), 
aff’d sub nom. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016).  For background 
discussion, see supra notes 142–76 and accompanying text. 
313. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 970 (1986). 
314. See id. at 966 (discussing the filed rate doctrine and the principle that once FERC sets a 
rate, a state cannot interfere with FERC’s authority by declaring that rate to be unreasonable); Rossi, 
supra note 6, at 1607–08 (discussing the preemption effects of the filed rate doctrine and the 
imprudent exception to the doctrine). 
315. See Spence, supra note 9, at 767–74 (chronicling the decline of vertically integrated energy 
markets along with the traditional cost-of-service regulation model). 
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enforce market rules depends not only on whether it has authority to regulate 
an activity but also on the agency’s monitoring resources and enforcement 
priorities.  It seems particularly misguided to assume that federal agency 
regulators will be positioned to regulate every market transaction.316  Courts 
should be especially wary of extending field preemption principles to pro 
forma or industry-wide tariffs or rules.  New York v. FERC recognizes these 
kinds of general restructuring rules and tariffs as foundational to the 
operation of both electricity and natural-gas markets.317  But unless FERC 
were to actually monitor and enforce these marketwide rules, extending a 
preemptive effect would leave large categories of market behavior 
unregulated.318  
To the extent that such broad federal preemption continues to apply at 
all, its application should be limited to those situations where FERC clearly 
exercises regulatory authority over substantive aspects of wholesale 
transactions, like setting wholesale energy rates.  In this kind of context, 
federal regulators have established clear market rules and effective ways to 
monitor market conduct, providing the most compelling case for federal 
preemption.  Still too, such a preemption analysis is not automatic but 
requires a careful assessment of foundational facts related to federal 
jurisdiction.  For example, it was an essential predicate to the Court’s 
preemption analysis in Hughes that “FERC extensively regulates the 
structure of the PJM capacity auction to ensure that it efficiently balances 
supply and demand, producing a just and reasonable clearing price.”319  As 
the Court also acknowledged, “FERC has approved the PJM capacity auction 
as the sole ratesetting mechanism for sales of capacity to PJM, and has 
deemed the clearing price per se just and reasonable.”320  The Court 
concluded that FERC’s regulation of PJM’s wholesale-capacity-market 
pricing mechanism preempted Maryland’s incentives,321 but it would be a 
stretch to extend similar preemptive effect to FERC’s mere jurisdiction over 
any practice that looks like a wholesale sale (such as net metering) or affects 
a wholesale transaction, regardless of how FERC has regulated it.  Hughes 
simply does not speak to how wholesale markets fail to price important 
 
316. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 6, at 1626 (arguing that FERC does not have the opportunity 
to assess “every potential violation of the public interest” and that FERC and other agencies 
“frequently lack the authority to pursue or impose” remedies for misconduct). 
317. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 14 (2002) (noting that FERC’s open-access regime 
was not targeted at individual behaviors, but was aimed at addressing a systemic, marketwide 
problem). 
318. See Rossi, supra note 6, at 1645–46 (discussing how blind adherence to the filed rate 
doctrine produces sweeping preemption and a similar type of regulatory gap). 
319. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1294 (2016). 
320. Id. at 1297. 
321. Id. 
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values, such as environmental concerns and reliability.322  If FERC has not 
adopted a regime that provides the exclusive pricing of these values in the 
wholesale market, states still have plenty of space to adopt their own 
initiatives to promote them with incentives and subsidies that are not directed 
at wholesale rates.  For example, New York has recently adopted an 
ambitious clean-energy standard that includes zero-emission credits for 
nuclear plants,323 a plan that is already facing a legal challenge on federal-
preemption grounds.324  If these credits are calculated based on carbon 
attributes of the energy produced, which is not priced in the interstate market, 
they do not contradict Hughes.  But, if the credits are directly tagged to 
wholesale-market prices of energy, they could be preempted like the 
Maryland scheme.325  This kind of analysis would require a case-specific 
assessment of whether the state incentives contravene federally approved 
market prices. 
At its extreme, extending exclusive preemptive authority to FERC in 
areas where states are providing complementary regulation risks the creation 
of a new form of regulatory gap, where neither state nor federal regulators 
can address the pricing of certain attributes of power supply.  In adopting 
New Deal-era energy statutes, Congress was likely unaware of the full range 
of challenges that would be presented to modern energy markets, but 
avoiding a regulatory “no man’s land” is just as fundamental and important 
to the efficient operation of energy markets today as closing the Attleboro 
gap was to Congress in 1935.  New York v. FERC reasons that the types of 
regulatory gaps the FPA was designed to address are not fixed in time based 
on constitutional limits on state-regulatory authority circa 1935 but include 
practical challenges for interstate energy markets.326  ONEOK echoes this 
 
322. While Hughes does not directly speak to these values, it does recognize that PJM’s 
capacity markets were focused on reliability; however, many other wholesale markets regulated by 
FERC do not make an effort to price capacity, leaving this reliability function to state regulators.  
Id. at 1298.  Also, Hughes envisions states continuing to play some role in promoting clean-energy 
resources.  See id. at 1299 (naming clean-energy generation as a priority states might seek to 
encourage through various incentives or state regulation policies). 
323. Steven Mufson, New York State Just Rescued a Nuclear Plant from Oblivion. Why That’s 
a Very Big Deal, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2016/08/09/new-york-state-just-rescued-a-nuclear-plant-from-
oblivion/?utm_term=.a1255c9b372c [https://perma.cc/DKT4-DVQT]. 
324. Saqib Rahim, Challenge Looms for N.Y.’s Clean Energy Standard, E&E PUB. (Aug. 24, 
2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060041976 [https://perma.cc/4WUX-CWGQ]. 
325. Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Cost and Decarbonization, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 34–36), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833870 [https://perma.cc/9EP6-CRFH]. See generally Joel B. Eisen, Dual 
Electricity Federalism Is Dead, But How Dead and What Replaces It?, 8 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY 
& ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author). 
326. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 21 (2002) (reasoning that, while the FPA may have 
addressed the gap identified in Attleboro, the regulatory power the FPA grants is not limited by 
Attleboro but is more expansive). 
ROSSI.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2016  11:08 AM 
450 Texas Law Review [Vol. 95:399 
principle in recognizing concurrent state jurisdiction to complement federal 
antitrust enforcement in modern natural-gas markets.327 
Recognizing the statutory purpose of avoiding regulatory gaps calls for 
a more dynamic assessment of jurisdiction, but this does not put everything 
up for grabs anew each time there is a federalism dispute involving energy 
markets.  Rather, in assessing preemption the Court’s decisions in ONEOK 
and Hughes show that the key inquiry is whether a state law targets a federal 
regulation.328  In ONEOK, the Court emphasized that, as a general matter, 
state antitrust law can complement federal antitrust regulation.329  Hughes 
emphasized how the capacity market (as approved by FERC) was intended 
to serve as the sole way of pricing power-supply capacity for wholesale sales 
in PJM,330 but other regional pricing approaches in the wholesale market will 
require a different assessment of the interaction of federal and state law.  For 
example, in regions of the United States where there is no wholesale-
interstate-capacity market (such as most of the Southeast),331 a state 
presumably would retain its jurisdiction to address retail reliability by 
adopting incentives to expand generation.  Even outside of these areas, states 
may adopt incentives and subsidies to address energy attributes, such as 
carbon emissions, that FERC-regulated wholesale energy markets fail to 
price.332  The preemption analysis ultimately depends on the reviewing 
court’s foundational factual findings regarding federal regulation of a market 
activity and its interaction with state regulation of the same market activity, 
 
327. See ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599 (2015) (holding that the NGA, 
drafted to preserve continued exercise of state power, does not preempt state-law antitrust actions). 
328. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1298 (2016) (“States, of course, 
may regulate within the domain Congress assigned to them even when their laws incidentally affect 
areas within FERC’s domain.  But States may not seek to achieve ends, however legitimate, through 
regulatory means that intrude on FERC’s authority over interstate wholesale rates, as Maryland has 
done here.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)); see ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599 (2015) (indicating 
that whether the NGA preempts a particular state law turns on “the target at which the state law 
aims”). 
329. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599. 
330. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1297 (“FERC has approved the PJM capacity auction as the sole 
ratesetting mechanism for sales of capacity to PJM, and has deemed the clearing price per se just 
and reasonable.”). 
331. FERC, ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET BASICS 40 (2015), 
https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DBR-4E4Z] 
(noting that the Southeast operates “under [a] more traditional market structure[]” and that the 
Southeastern states do not participate in RTOs or independent system operators (ISOs), both of 
which “operate the transmission system independently of, and foster competition for electricity 
generation among, wholesale-market participants”). 
332. See supra notes 323–25 and accompanying text (addressing New York’s recently adopted 
Zero Emission Credits). 
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focusing on whether the target at which the state law is aimed presents an 
unacceptable conflict with a federal regulatory initiative.333 
Regulatory gaps can be symmetrical—they can apply to both federal 
and state regulation.  Recognizing this provides a principled basis for 
acknowledging the importance of expansive federal authority in some 
contexts,334 and broad state authority in others.335  There thus is nothing 
inconsistent with EPSA’s endorsement of expansive FERC jurisdiction to 
address demand response in wholesale markets and continued state 
regulation of many of the same market activities—even if these might 
directly touch upon wholesale energy sales.  Rather, the key inquiry needs to 
focus on whether a preemption determination advances or hinders the 
statutory purpose of avoiding a regulatory no man’s land in energy markets—
a question entirely ignored by previous precedents that embrace dual 
sovereignty. 
B. Federal Regulatory Floors for Energy Markets 
Recognition of statutory authorization for concurrent jurisdiction in the 
regulation of modern energy markets holds promise for energy law to move 
in bold new directions because it enables innovative approaches to 
collaboration between federal and state regulators.  Statutes such as the FPA 
already explicitly allow for some collaboration between federal and state 
regulators.  Robert Nordhaus has recently reminded us of one example 
explicitly mentioned in the statute.336  Section 209 authorizes FERC to hold 
joint hearings with state regulators and to set up joint boards to address 
matters otherwise within FERC’s jurisdiction.337  Elsewhere, the FPA 
provides for interstate compacts to address transmission approval.338  To date, 
however, these formalized, collaborative approaches have not been used 
successfully.339 
 
333. As the Court concludes in Hughes, “So long as a State does not condition payment of funds 
on capacity clearing the auction, the State’s program would not suffer from the same fatal defect 
that renders Maryland’s program unacceptable.”  Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299. 
334. See FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 780–81 (2016) 
(recognizing FERC’s authority to regulate wholesale demand response markets). 
335. See Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299 (leaving avenues open for states to promote clean energy); 
ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599–1601 (2015) (recognizing that state antitrust 
law can complement federal regulation). 
336. See Nordhaus, supra note 3, at 214–15 (describing FPA’s authorization of joint federal–
state hearings and boards composed of state officials but recognizing that the “mechanism” is rarely 
used). 
337. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 209, 49 Stat. 838, 853 (1935) (codified as amended 
at 16 U.S.C. § 824h (2012)). 
338. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 1221, § 216(i), 119 Stat. 946, 950–
51 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i) (2012)). 
339. See Klass & Rossi, supra note 50, at 135 (observing that no interstate transmission-siting 
compact has been adopted); Nordhaus, supra note 3, at 214–15 (observing that the FPA’s joint-
board mechanism “is rarely used”). 
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Beyond the explicit statutory authorization to create new collaborative 
institutions, federal and state regulators have taken their own initiative to 
pursue many new avenues for regulatory coordination.  One such approach 
is what Hari Osofsky and Hannah Wiseman call “dynamic federalism,”340 
exemplified most clearly by FERC’s initiative to encourage voluntary RTOs 
as private institutions to help manage and coordinate interstate energy 
markets.341  Such multistate-institutional arrangements have played an 
undeniable role in forging dynamic new types of energy markets, though they 
have required state regulators to acquiesce by approving new transmission 
and generation investments by regulated utilities that participate in RTOs.342 
Similarly, FERC’s regulation of regional-grid planning and cost 
allocation has encouraged state experimentation in clean-energy policies to 
reinforce federal goals related to the operation of regional markets.343  
Increasingly, as new renewable-energy supply comes online, FERC is being 
asked to work with states in integrating these resources into interstate energy 
markets.344  As Emily Hammond and David Spence observe, however, overly 
broad federal preemption of state incentives for new electric-power capacity 
makes consistent integration of renewable-resource capacity into energy 
markets nearly impossible, since many renewable resources are dependent on 
state incentives.345 
By contrast, recognition of concurrent jurisdiction opens up new 
institutional arrangements where state and federal regulators can coordinate 
regulatory approaches or operate adjacent programs that touch on the same 
regulatory topics, such as solar net metering programs.  Just like demand 
response, authorization of customer energy resource participation in 
wholesale markets presently requires states to opt in.346  Elsewhere, Thomas 
Hutton and I have argued that these kinds of arrangements point to the 
possibility of cooperative federalism under energy statutes, allowing FERC 
to establish federal objectives, such as the promotion of clean energy, and 
 
340. Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 21, at 814–24. 
341. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 809, 811, 831 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified 
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
342. Id. at 811. 
343. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating 
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49842, 49848–51 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
344. Id. at 49848. 
345. See Hammond & Spence, supra note 10, at 199–201 (noting FERC’s recent efforts to 
“incentivize a greener grid” and that “some of [these] efforts have also bumped up against the 
potential limits of its jurisdiction”). 
346. See Jim Rossi, Federalism and the Net Metering Alternative, ELECTRICITY J., Jan.–Feb. 
2016, at 13, 13 (observing that over forty states have authorized net metering programs); Jim Rossi 
& Jon Wellinghoff, FERC v. EPSA and Adjacent State Regulation of Customer Energy Resources, 
40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 23, 28–29 (2016) (observing that states generally have flexibility in 
crafting their net metering policies). 
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enlist state cooperation in their implementation.347  To take one example, 
while Congress has specifically authorized a federal floor when it comes to 
power-grid reliability, the FPA also recognizes that states can go further in 
enacting more rigorous reliability standards.348  Recognition of concurrent 
jurisdiction would allow for federal regulation of energy markets without 
automatically preempting state experimentation and, especially, state 
approaches that advance the same goals federal regulators have endorsed.349 
In a bold recognition of this possibility, the Supreme Court’s 2016 EPSA 
opinion observes, “[w]holesale demand response as implemented in the Rule 
is a program of cooperative federalism, in which the States retain the last 
word.”350  Other energy statutes have been recognized as endorsing 
cooperative federalism,351 and scholars have advanced the argument that the 
FPA and NGA are compatible with this approach.352  EPSA’s novelty is that 
it is the first Supreme Court decision to explicitly recognize cooperative 
federalism as compatible with the allocation of federal–state power under a 
New Deal-era energy statute. 
The Court’s decision also sheds light on the significance of FERC’s role 
in establishing these kinds of arrangements.  The Court reasoned that FERC’s 
demand response rule’s “opt-out” opportunity for states (who may choose to 
eliminate customer bidding into wholesale demand response markets) 
“removes any conceivable doubt” as to its compliance with the allocation of 
federal–state authority under the FPA.353  While the opt-out feature of Order 
745 may have deflated any claim by the challengers that FERC’s rule was 
coercive, nothing in EPSA concluded that allowing states the opportunity to 
veto customer participation in FERC’s wholesale-market programs is always 
necessary to sustain a cooperative federalism program under the FPA.354  A 
 
347. See Rossi & Hutton, supra note 21, at 1288–89 (arguing that federal energy statutes are 
consistent with floor preemption, which allows subnational energy-regulation innovations). 
348. The Electricity Modernization Act of 2005 expands federal regulation over reliability but 
also specifically states that this is not intended “to preempt any authority of any State to take action 
to ensure the safety, adequacy, and reliability of electric service within that State, . . . as long as 
such action does not result in lesser reliability outside the State . . . .” Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. 109-58, sec. 1211, § 215(h)(3), 119 Stat. 941, 945 (2005) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824o(i)(3) (2012)). 
349. See Rossi & Hutton, supra note 21, at 1288 (describing the concept of floor preemption, 
in which federal law provides “only a minimum that precludes more lax state standards” and leaves 
“states the authority to adopt more restrictive requirements”). 
350. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 780 (2016). 
351. See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 (1982) (noting that the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act establishes a program of cooperative federalism). 
352. See, e.g., Rossi & Hutton, supra note 21, at 1316 (arguing that “the history and structure 
of the FPA favor an alternative approach—energy federalism—that allows the use of floor 
preemption tools”). 
353. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 779–80. 
354. To the extent this is an open question, it will likely be resolved under constitutional (rather 
than statutory) federalism doctrines.  Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992) 
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state opt out does not appear necessary under EPSA to support FERC’s 
jurisdiction to address demand response insofar as FERC’s regulation 
ultimately hinges on the participation of demand response providers in 
wholesale markets, not on any sort of claim that FERC lacks the power to 
preempt states. 
EPSA thus appears to leave FERC a considerable range of options in 
addressing state regulations that impede the effective operation of interstate-
energy markets that FERC regulates.  For example, if FERC were to make a 
finding that state prohibitions on customer participation in wholesale demand 
response markets impairs competition in wholesale power markets, FERC 
presumably could make a discrimination finding and preempt these 
prohibitions.  In FERC’s rules regarding transmission planning, for example, 
the agency decided to preempt many state rights of first refusal that favor 
incumbent utilities, though the agency limited its preemption to wholesale 
transmission.355  As it has with demand response, FERC could have chosen 
to allow states an opt-out process for rights of first refusal.  But in recognizing 
how this is harmful to interstate competition and discriminates against 
merchant transmission providers, FERC instead chose to preempt states, 
setting a floor in the basic ground rules surrounding transmission planning.356  
Ultimately, EPSA recognizes that these are not decisions that are dictated by 
an abstract principle of federalism or state sovereignty under the FPA.  
Rather, at the core these are pragmatic choices about the best institutional 
balance for regulating modern energy markets—decisions that Congress has 
delegated to FERC in recognition of its expertise. 
C. Clearing the Jurisprudential Thicket 
In order for these kinds of institutional federalism arrangements to 
succeed, however, courts must eliminate once and for all the doctrinal relics 
of dual sovereignty.357  It is time for the Court to recognize that field 
preemption, long celebrated in energy regulation, is an anachronism that 
should no longer have a role in modern preemption analysis under these 
statutes.  At the very least, field preemption needs to be limited to its 
supporting precedents involving cost-of-service regulation, where state and 
federal regulators were applying the same basic regulatory model and 
objectives.  In areas where concurrent jurisdiction is authorized, it remains 
 
(discussing how programs of cooperative federalism have been replicated in a number of federal 
statutes). 
355. For discussion of this issue, see Klass & Rossi, supra note 50, at 193. 
356. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating 
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49842, 49846 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (outlining 
minimum requirements for state public utility transmission providers). 
357. In raising concerns with the rise of “national federalism without doctrine,” Abbe Gluck 
also recognizes fifteen doctrinal questions presented by forms of statutory federalism more 
generally.  Gluck, supra note 20, at 2022–42. 
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important for courts and federal regulators to be attentive to the factual and 
policy rationales that support jurisdiction, approaching these questions 
prospectively rather than in reaction to dual sovereignty arguments advanced 
by litigants.  Finally, courts must recognize their own limits in resolving 
energy-federalism disputes and better clarify the significance of democratic 
agency procedures and expertise in advancing federalism. 
1. Ending Wholesale-Market Field Preemption.—The rise of concurrent 
jurisdiction calls into question whether the traditional field preemption 
doctrine should continue to play any role under energy statutes.  Precedents 
such as Nantahala and Schneidewind remain good law.  However, at the very 
minimum they need to be limited in their application to scenarios involving 
similar cost-of-service regulatory tools, if not recast as applications of 
conflict rather than field preemption.  Field preemption is simply 
incompatible with the recognition of concurrent jurisdiction over aspects of 
wholesale energy markets under these statutes.  It leads to overly broad 
federal preemption decisions, routinely confuses courts, and thwarts the 
primary purposes of these energy statutes by creating the potential for new 
regulatory gaps.358 
Even the core energy precedents decided by the Court using field-
preemption language acknowledge that field-preemption analysis cannot, on 
its own terms, answer the core federalism questions that need to be addressed.  
Consider again Nantahala, one of the leading modern field-preemption cases 
under the FPA.  The Court held that since “FERC clearly has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the rates to be charged . . . interstate wholesale customers,” 
a state “may not conclude in setting retail rates that the FERC-approved 
wholesale rates are unreasonable.”359  A state is prohibited, for example, from 
“trapping” costs by exercising its “undoubted jurisdiction over retail sales to 
prevent the wholesaler-as-seller from recovering the costs of paying the 
FERC-approved rate.”360  While the Court spoke here in terms of exclusive 
jurisdiction, it is a mistake to conclude that, as a categorical matter, the setting 
of wholesale rates “field preempts” states.  The Court did not reason that the 
statute itself occupied the field, but instead spoke in terms of the potential 
“interference” that states could present to FERC-approved rates without a 
finding of federal preemption.361  Courts have recognized that this is not a 
 
358. As Justice Kagan astutely observed in her concurrence in Kurns v. Railroad Friction 
Products Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012), “[v]iewed through the lens of modern preemption law, 
[Justice Brandeis’s field-preemption decision in] Napier is an anachronism.”  Id. at 1270 (Kagan, J., 
concurring). 
359. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986). 
360. Id. at 970. 
361. See id. at 966 (rejecting the argument that the scope of FPC jurisdiction over wholesale 
gas and electricity should be determined on a case-by-case basis and instead determining that 
deference should be given to Congress’s intent to ensure states do not interfere with FERC’s 
authority to set wholesale rates). 
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bright-line or categorical approach to preemption.  Some have devised an 
exception to the filed-rate-preemption approach of Nantahala, recognizing 
that states may deny a utility the opportunity to recover costs incurred as a 
result of buying power at FERC-approved rates if the specific purchase (apart 
from the actual rate that was paid) is deemed imprudent.362 
To the extent that Nantahala’s reasoning relies on an assessment of 
whether a specific state-regulatory action interferes with a particular federal 
rate, however, it is not an application of field preemption at all.  Instead, in 
placing its primary attention on tensions between a federal and state 
approach, the key inquiry becomes whether the state-regulatory action 
presents an obstacle to the implementation of a federal-approved wholesale 
rate.  Using field preemption to reach this conclusion would eliminate a broad 
range of state-regulatory decisions assessing prudence, which the Court in 
Nantahala explicitly preserved for state regulators.363  Field preemption 
simply does none of a court’s primary analytical work in reaching a 
preemption conclusion.  Instead, at the very minimum, a court reaching a 
conclusion of federal preemption always implicitly depends on its assessment 
of whether a state-regulatory decision presents an obstacle.  Moreover, 
resorting to field preemption can lead to overbroad preemption decisions, in 
effect foreclosing a broad range of otherwise permissible state regulatory 
actions.364 
The recent rise of concurrent jurisdiction also throws into question 
whether Schneidewind, another darling of the dual sovereignty approach, 
should continue to be understood as a field preemption case.  Field 
preemption would foreclose any state regulation in the relevant field as a 
matter of implied preemption.  However, despite its strong field preemption 
rhetoric, Schneidewind itself suggests that the scope of the field can only be 
determined upon an examination of the objective of the particular state 
regulation at issue.365  Drawing on a similar approach, ONEOK elaborates 
that this requires an inquiry into “the target at which the state law aims.”366 
In other words, this is more of a conflict or obstacle than a field preemption 
test.  A broad interpretation of Schneidewind is even more problematic in that 
it would authorize FERC to make broad regulatory decisions that undermine 
 
362. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. v. Patch, 167 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1998) (adopting the imprudent 
exception in the First Circuit); Pike Cty. Light & Power Co.–Elec. Div. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
465 A.2d 735, 737–38 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (holding that a state may deny a utility company 
from recovering costs for purchasing power at a FERC-approved rate when cheaper alternatives are 
available). 
363. See Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 972 (assuming without deciding that states retain authority to 
address the prudency of purchased-power decisions). 
364. For a discussion of the necessity of careful assessment of preemption in the context of 
particular federal approval of a monitoring action regarding wholesale rates, see Rossi, supra note 
6, at 1642–44. 
365. See supra notes 293–95 and accompanying text. 
366. ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599 (2015). 
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state environmental-protection goals under the Clean Water Act or other 
environmental statutes that delegate a role to state regulators.367  
If the form of field preemption Justice Brandeis had in mind in Napier 
was ever appropriate for energy statutes, these cases illustrate that it no longer 
has a place in federalism disputes in modern energy markets.  At the very 
minimum, if these decisions continue to be construed as field preemption 
cases, their scope should be limited to wholesale rates actually set or 
approved by FERC and should not include federal regulation of practices 
affecting rates.  Instead of relying on the fiction of field preemption, courts 
need to focus on whether federal and state regulations of energy markets are 
compatible.  For example, in finding federal preemption of the Maryland 
generation incentives, Hughes relies on foundational facts regarding FERC’s 
approach to regulating PJM’s capacity market368 and the regulatory target at 
which the Maryland program aims (namely, the FERC-approved wholesale 
capacity market).369  It did not frame the preemption analysis in terms of some 
abstract, fixed field defined by statute, but carefully assessed facts regarding 
the nature of FERC’s regulation of the PJM capacity market and applied the 
aims test from ONEOK.370  For all practical purposes, it thus appears that the 
Supreme Court has replaced energy field preemption with an assessment of 
obstacle preemption (in the setting of wholesale rates, under FERC’s 
substantive jurisdiction) or conflict preemption (in assessing FERC’s 
exercise of remedial jurisdiction over practices affecting rates).371 
At bottom, in the regulation of modern energy markets, field preemption 
is little more than a fiction.  It ultimately does none of the analytical work in 
assessing whether federal energy statutes preempt state regulations since a 
preemption finding under these statutes ultimately depends on first assessing 
the issue as an obstacle or conflict preemption case.  Absent clear language 
to the contrary in a statute or in an agency’s explicit decision to exercise 
broad preemption over a specific activity, preemption analysis in modern 
 
367. For a discussion of this issue, see generally Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, 
Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy Transportation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017). 
368. See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1294 (2016) (discussing the policy 
and factual concerns that influenced Maryland’s regulators to develop the program at issue). 
369. Id. at 1298–99. 
370. This observation is made clear by Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Hughes.  See id. at 
1300 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Using the purpose of the Federal Power Act as the ‘ultimate 
touchstone’ of its pre-emption inquiry rather than resting on generic pre-emption frameworks 
unrelated to the Federal Power Act, the Court holds that Maryland has impermissibly impeded the 
performance of one of FERC’s core regulatory duties.” (citation omitted)); id. (“The Court, 
however, also rightly recognizes the importance of protecting the States’ ability to contribute, within 
their regulatory domain, to the Federal Power Act’s goal of ensuring a sustainable supply of efficient 
and price effective energy.”). 
371. The sole remaining exception may be Justice Thomas, whose concurrence in Hughes 
purports to support preemption based entirely on the FPA’s delegation of authority to FERC to 
regulate wholesale energy sales.  Id. at 1301 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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energy markets should attempt a case-by-case analysis of foundational facts 
and of regulatory conflict, and should not be decided based on field 
preemption alone.  Courts would be well-advised to abandon the use of field 
preemption in this context entirely. 
Despite the Court’s recent movement away from dual sovereignty, some 
courts may not have received a clean enough message.  For example, to date, 
at least one Eighth Circuit Judge’s opinion takes the wrong message 
altogether from Hughes, citing the case to endorse dual sovereignty and a 
sweeping application of field preemption.372  This opinion is particularly 
startling because, unlike the PJM market tariff that was the source of federal 
preemption in Hughes, under the Midcontinent Independent Transmission 
System Operator (MISO) tariff at issue no regulator or court has found FERC 
has exclusive authority to regulate all aspects of energy capacity markets in 
Minnesota and North Dakota.373  Fortunately, no other judge joined the 
opinion,374 so it is unlikely to have a precedential impact, but it shows how 
lower courts are slow to move away from dual sovereignty’s doctrinal relics 
such as field preemption—even following clear, recent signals from the 
Supreme Court of a more pragmatic jurisdictional approach. 
2. Factual and Policy Rationales for Federal Jurisdiction.—Of course 
attention to the nature of jurisdiction will often also require that courts define 
its scope.  Outside of narrow activities that are explicitly designated as 
beyond the reach of federal regulators, EPSA emphasizes that the starting 
inquiry in addressing federalism disputes in energy statutes is whether federal 
regulators are authorized to address an activity.375  In deciding whether 
federal regulation is authorized to regulate in the first place courts must pay 
attention to the statute itself, rather than some abstract set of federalism 
canons or principles that lack any foundation in statutory law. 
One of the concerns raised by modern extensions of federal jurisdiction 
under energy statutes—and at the core of the D.C. Circuit opinion holding 
that FERC lacks jurisdiction over demand response376—is whether the statute 
contains any “limiting principle” to constrain FERC’s assertion of authority 
over energy markets.  These limiting principles are important to recognizing 
that federal regulation cannot go too far.  Perhaps this concern is just as 
significant today, where there are fears of federal energy regulators indirectly 
imposing a carbon tax,377 as it was during the New Deal era. 
 
372. See North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 927 (8th Cir. 2016) (Murphy, J., concurring 
in part) (referring to FERC’s jurisdiction to regulate “certain parameters” of the capacity market as 
exclusive). 
373. Id. at 913–17. 
374. Id. at 923. 
375. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016). 
376. See supra notes 132–40 and accompanying text. 
377. For the claim that FERC has sweeping statutory authority to address carbon emissions 
through its regulation of energy markets, see generally Christopher J. Bateman & James T.B. Tripp, 
ROSSI.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2016  11:08 AM 
2016] The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism 459 
The Supreme Court’s decision in EPSA acknowledges a limiting 
principle for FERC’s exercise of expansive jurisdiction over market practices 
related to wholesale rates.  As Joel Eisen has highlighted, courts have an 
established standard to discern practices that “directly affect” rates, in 
contrast to those practices that merely have an incidental effect on rates.378  
Under section 205 of the FPA, which required FERC to evaluate individual 
utility rates for the sale of power at wholesale, these principles are well 
established as a limit on FERC’s jurisdiction in regulating the “rates or 
charges” demanded or received, as well as “all rules or regulations affecting 
or pertaining” to such rates or charges.379  EPSA correctly applied this test in 
making a judicial finding that demand response is squarely within FERC’s 
jurisdiction.380 
But courts should not overread EPSA as requiring courts themselves to 
always connect harms to remedies under the FPA in assessing whether FERC 
is acting within its jurisdiction.  This causation test, which links practices to 
the rates associated with any particular utility’s sales, is best understood as a 
pragmatic requirement for FERC to make factual and policy findings, not as 
a fixed judicial or common law threshold a court can articulate in the abstract.  
It is significant to note that, under New Deal-era energy statutes, FERC’s 
remedial authority to act proactively is not automatic, but requires the agency 
to make some finding of undue discrimination.  Under section 206 of the 
FPA, FERC is authorized to initiate proactive proceedings to address 
industry-wide practices.381  But as the Court observed in New York v. FERC, 
section 206 requires FERC to affirmatively make a discrimination finding 
before it can exercise its remedial authority over “practices . . . affecting” 
rates.382  An expansive construction of FERC’s power to address 
“practices . . . affecting” rates is hardly a roving invitation for the agency to 
impose any proactive policy preference it chooses on firms in energy 
markets.  Rather, the statute constrains the agency by requiring it show a 
pragmatic linkage to interstate wholesale sales and also to make an 
affirmative finding of undue discrimination. 
 
Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (2014) 
(arguing that the FPA implicitly allows FERC to consider environmental effects of power 
generation in setting just and reasonable rates), and STEVEN WEISSMAN & ROMANY WEBB, 2 
ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT LEGISLATION: HOW THE FEDERAL ENERGY 
REGULATORY COMMISSION CAN USE ITS EXISTING LEGAL AUTHORITY TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS AND INCREASE CLEAN ENERGY USE 3 (2014), 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/CLEE/FERC_Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U3V-
PH58] (outlining ways FERC could act while “relying on its current legal authority”). 
378. See Eisen, supra note 60, at 1812–34 (describing the development and evolution of the 
standard). 
379. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 205(a), 49 Stat. 838, 851 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012)). 
380. See supra notes 233–43 and accompanying text. 
381. Federal Power Act, sec. 213, § 206(a) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a)). 
382. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 27 (2002). 
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This kind of discrimination finding by FERC allows federal jurisdiction 
to evolve and adapt to new factual and policy circumstances.  No doubt, after 
EPSA, FERC has expansive potential authority over practices affecting 
wholesale rates, as well as clear regulatory tools authorizing federal 
regulation.  However, while EPSA appears to embrace strong deference to 
FERC regarding its factual findings and policy positions,383 that does not 
leave the agency the ability to broaden or contract its jurisdiction over energy 
markets without principle.  In adopting proactive marketwide rules, it is not 
enough that the tools regulators used to address discriminatory practices 
relate to wholesale markets in some general sense.  Rather, at the time these 
rules are adopted, federal regulators are obligated to show how their rules are 
directly related to wholesale rates, or are tailored to address the kind of 
market discrimination that FERC has identified as a basis for exercising 
jurisdiction over a practice that affects wholesale rates. 
For example, FERC would be acting on questionable authority if it 
simply declares illegal an industry-wide practice because the agency has 
concluded that this practice disadvantages a specific energy supplier or power 
generator without any additional facts or explanation.  Rather, FERC must 
accompany such an assertion of jurisdiction with an explanation of how this 
kind of discrimination connects to the wholesale energy markets over which 
it has jurisdiction.  The FPA, along with the basic expectations of arbitrary 
and capricious review, obligates FERC to explain how such a remedy is 
connected to the goal of protecting consumers or competitive power markets, 
so the agency would be obligated to provide factual findings or policy 
rationales to support its assertion of jurisdiction based on the harm to a 
supplier.  The agency would be standing on its firmest ground in regulating 
“practice . . . affecting” rates if it not only makes a finding or provides a 
policy rationale regarding why such discrimination is harmful but also 
explains how its remedy is tailored to address that form of harm.384 
After EPSA, regulators ignore these factual and policy rationales at their 
peril, as they derive from the clear language of the statute and also are an 
expectation of arbitrary and capricious review.  There is a danger if courts 
make these findings themselves, rather than review the agency’s findings 
with deference where appropriate.  But it also would be harmful for courts to 
 
383. See Sharon B. Jacobs, Energy Deference, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 49, 51–54 (2016) 
(discussing how the Court’s analysis in EPSA represents a variation of “thin rationality” review or 
“super deference”). 
384. See Matthew R. McGuire, Comment, (Mis)Understanding “Undue Discrimination”: 
FERC’s Misguided Effort to Extend the Boundaries of the Federal Power Act, 19 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 549, 576–77 (2012), for an argument to similar effect.  Although McGuire uses a similar 
argument to critique FERC’s regulations that favor independent transmission lines, id. at 550–52, I 
am not convinced that this is outside of FERC’s jurisdiction.  FERC made multiple findings that 
support a need for new transmission investment and that utility-based financing has systematically 
led to underinvestment and reduced competition in the industry.  I am thus much more sympathetic 
to FERC’s effort to regulate transmission planning than McGuire. 
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ignore the need for some agency findings to support expansive jurisdiction 
into practices related to wholesale energy markets.  While EPSA undeniably 
embraces deference to FERC, it does not eviscerate the FPA’s core 
requirements.  The agency must explain how a practice is connected to 
wholesale rates, why this produces discrimination that is harmful, and how 
the agency’s remedies are connected (or directly related) to these harms. 
3. Encouraging Agency (Rather Than Judicial) Preemption.—
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions regarding energy statutes 
open the possibility that energy federalism will finally follow the path of 
many other statutory-federalism programs.  Jessica Bulman-Polzen has 
recently offered a qualified defense of executive-branch-led federalism as a 
way of improving the democratic political process.385  A number of other 
scholars have also advanced an argument that agency preemption can be as 
transparent and democratic as relying on Congress to make preemption 
decisions.386  In areas such as health care, environmental law, and marijuana 
prohibition enforcement, the preferred approach to federalism is primarily an 
executive-branch prerogative, rather than an invitation for the judiciary to 
impose its own federalism.387  
Especially in contexts where Congress has delegated broad authority to 
a federal agency to regulate market structure and activities, such as under 
energy statutes, an executive-led approach to preemption analysis can help to 
ensure that regulation does not leave market activities unchecked.  Even if 
dual sovereignty is no longer required by statute, federal-energy regulators 
possess the power to affirmatively preempt state regulation, in instances 
where they believe that this promotes regulatory goals.  For example, as I 
have highlighted, in instances where FERC presents a factual and policy 
rationale that state regulation promotes discrimination against nonincumbent 
energy suppliers or hinders interstate energy markets, it may be appropriate 
for federal regulators to address the activity.388 
Recognizing agency authority to preempt is necessary, but it is not 
sufficient to promote accountability and expertise in the regulation of energy 
markets.  To ensure democratic accountability for preemption decisions, it is 
important to ensure that the agency, not courts, make the ultimate decision 
regarding the preemptive effect (if any) of federal regulation.  As Galle and 
 
385. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953, 
954–55 (2016). 
386. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and 
the Quest for Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1525 (2009) 
(advocating “hard look” review of agency preemption decisions as a mechanism to retain agency 
accountability); Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, 
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1936–39 (2008) 
(defending agency preemption based on institutional competence and transparency arguments). 
387. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 385, at 976 (discussing these examples as emblematic of 
executive federalism). 
388. See supra note 241–52 and accompanying text. 
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Seidenfeld highlight, the “process behind the federal decision [to preempt 
state law] is nearly as important as its substance.”389  Given the impacts such 
a decision can have on state experimentation and on the underlying premise 
of state law as complementing federal regulation, such a decision is best made 
through an open and transparent agency decision-making process, such as 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, rather than as implicit regulatory choice or 
as a mere afterthought, as articulated in a brief.390 
An agency-preemption approach to energy federalism underscores the 
significance to the democratic process of an agency such as FERC making 
an open and transparent decision regarding what kind of institutional 
federalism arrangement is desirable for activities in energy markets.  Where 
FERC has failed to make such a preemption decision itself, it smacks of 
judicial imperialism for a court to impose its own view of preemption onto 
the agency for several reasons.   
First, notwithstanding Hughes, it is not at all clear that the FPA or (any 
other statute) creates an implied cause of action for a private party to ask a 
federal court to make a preemption determination that enjoins state regulation 
where the challenger is not seeking review of a FERC decision regarding 
preemption.391  As a general matter, FERC, not federal courts, should have 
the first bite at the apple in defining agency jurisdiction, especially where 
jurisdiction over new kinds of transactions or practices in energy markets are 
at issue.   
 
389. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 386, at 1997. 
390. Courts reviewing agency action have long disfavored post hoc agency articulation of 
rationales.  See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) (“The grounds upon which an 
administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was 
based.”); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 965 
(2007) (explaining that under the Chenery principle, an agency must articulate supporting facts and 
the underlying rationale for a decision at the time the agency acts, not after). 
391. The FPA, along with the Administrative Procedures Act, provides for judicial review of 
FERC decisions.  Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378, 392 (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. § 702 (2012)) (creating Title V of the United States Code, which includes the original 
Administrative Procedures Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)); Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 
sec. 213, § 313, 49 Stat. 838, 860 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824l (2012)). 
Importantly, however, these statutes do not expressly create an avenue for private challengers to 
raise federal preemption claims, requiring private challengers to ground their legal challenges in the 
Supremacy Clause.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012), federal district courts are prohibited from 
enjoining, suspending, or restraining operation or compliance with any order affecting rates 
chargeable by a public utility that is made by a state administrative agency or ratemaking body 
where jurisdiction is based solely on repugnance of the order to the federal Constitution and the 
order does not interfere with interstate commerce.  28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012).  In 2015, the Supreme 
Court held that the Constitution does not create a private cause of action to enjoin a state under the 
Supremacy Clause.  Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015).  It 
further held that equitable Ex parte Young-type preemption challenges to enjoin unlawful state 
action were foreclosed by a federal statute’s provision of other remedies and judicial 
administrability concerns.  Id. at 1385.  For development of the argument that implied private 
preemption claims can be problematic under the FPA, see Matthew R. Christiansen, The FPA and 
the Private Right to Preempt, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 129, 138–48 (2016). 
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Second, allowing judicial resolution of jurisdictional disputes prior to 
an agency’s decision about them is not desirable from the perspective of 
democratic accountability.  An agency is required to explain its preemption 
choices in an open and participatory administrative process and is also 
subject to congressional oversight, whereas a court lacks this kind of political 
accountability for its decisions regarding preemption under energy 
statutes.392   
Third, since any judicial preemption decisions binds an agency, 
premature judicial resolution of preemption disputes makes energy statutes 
less flexible and adaptive to new technological developments and market 
decisions.  By contrast, an agency preemption decision can be changed 
through the administrative decision-making process.  This sweeping 
precedential impact makes dual sovereignty a poor fit for the modern 
administrative process surrounding federal regulation. 
Where there is no transparent process or decision before an agency 
leading to a preemption finding, this should weigh against a court reaching a 
preemption decision on its own.  Such an approach has considerable support 
in the accepted administrative law principle that courts should not afford 
deference to post hoc agency rationales.393  For example, in upholding state 
antitrust remedies in ONEOK and refusing to extend Chevron394 deference to 
FERC, the Supreme Court considered it significant that FERC itself failed to 
take any position in its regulatory proceedings on whether it intended its 
regulatory approach to have a preemptive effect on states.395 
However, in upholding the Fourth Circuit’s rejection of Maryland’s 
incentives in Hughes, the Court was not sensitive to this concern.  Since the 
Supreme Court was reviewing a private challenge to the state program that 
was brought in federal court, it ultimately relied on judicial, rather than 
agency, factual determinations regarding the nature of federal regulation of 
capacity markets.396  However, FERC had failed to make any affirmative 
finding on its own that Maryland’s power-generation incentives presented a 
conflict with “just and reasonable” rates under PJM’s capacity-pricing plan, 
the matter pending on review in Hughes.397  Indeed, when asked to address 
these matters in its regulatory process, the agency even went so far as to claim 
 
392. See supra Part II (describing the sweeping preemption approach of dual sovereignty). 
393. See supra note 381–82 and accompanying text. 
394. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
395. ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1602–03 (2015). 
396. See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016) (“We agree with 
the Fourth Circuit’s judgment that Maryland’s program sets an interstate wholesale rate, 
contravening the FPA’s division of authority between state and federal regulators.” (emphasis 
added)). 
397. Id. at 1297–98 (discussing FERC’s reasons for rejecting Maryland’s plan but failing to 
acknowledge any affirmative findings made by FERC to prove a conflict with “just and reasonable” 
rates under PJM’s capacity-pricing plan). 
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that it was bound to the preemption approach of courts.398  FERC’s position 
that Maryland’s incentives are preempted was not the product of a transparent 
decision-making process and was only articulated post hoc, in reaction to 
judicial decisions and in its appellate briefs on review before the Supreme 
Court.  If FERC truly had wished to reject Maryland’s incentives, it could 
have made a transparent regulatory decision of its own to do so, rather than 
waiting for a court to make this decision in reviewing the agency.399 
To the extent that FERC chose not to make its own preemption decision 
regarding Maryland’s power-supply incentives in PJM, or refused to use its 
own regulatory processes to develop an agency position on preemption in 
modern-energy-capacity markets, this created the opportunity for a federal 
court hearing a private-federal-preemption challenge to the state program to 
step in and make its own foundational factual findings regarding state power-
supply incentives.  Perhaps lower courts and the Supreme Court got these 
foundational facts and the ultimate conclusion right, and PJM’s tariff (as 
initially approved by FERC) is, in fact, the sole way of pricing capacity in 
this particular regional organized market.  Importantly, however, FERC took 
no position itself on the issue and courts brought no particular expertise to 
adjudicating these factual findings.400 
More significantly still, such judicial findings could leave federal 
regulators little flexibility to work with states, exasperating the type of 
“reverse” Attleboro gap hypothesized above401—judicially assigning FERC 
de jure authority even where the agency has shown no interest at all in 
exercising it.  It thus seems inconsistent with energy statutes such as the FPA 
for courts to make a preemption finding where FERC has not previously done 
so itself, especially when the effect of preemption is to preclude any 
complementary state regulation.  This kind of judicially imposed preemption 
 
398. See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text. 
399. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 
(2016) (No. 14-614) (“We don’t have FERC’s opinion.  We only have it through the SG. I thought 
there was a doctrine called primary jurisdiction . . . .”).  The Supreme Court’s opinion in Hughes 
did not address this. 
400. Even where, as in PJM, capacity markets provide some reliability pricing in the wholesale 
market, it is not clear that they provide a perfect market valuation of reliability values associated 
with different energy resources.  The American Public Power Association, for example, has 
highlighted how long-term contracts provide a superior way of promoting reliability in comparison 
to capacity markets and that capacity markets can result in different reliability pricing based on how 
a state chooses to address its retail market.  Randy Elliot, Staying Power of a Bad Idea: Capacity 
Markets’ Reliability Pricing Mechanism, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N (Sept. 8, 2015), 
http://blog.publicpower.org/sme/?p=761 [https://perma.cc/3N7B-PP9A].  For a similar argument 
being made in an amicus brief filed in the Hughes case, see Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Pub. Power 
Ass’n and Nat’l Rural Elec. Coop. Ass’n in Support of Petitioners at 29, Hughes v. Talen Energy 
Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2014) (No. 14-614) (arguing that “long-term contracting . . . [was] an 
intended and indispensable counterpart to the attainment” of FERC’s goal of supporting investment 
in new infrastructure). 
401. See supra subpart IV(A). 
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approach lacks any democratic process to ensure political accountability for 
the statutory interpretation behind it—a flaw that echoes the ghost of dual 
sovereignty to the extent that courts themselves routinely defined the 
jurisdictional bright line, not FERC.  By binding the agency’s ability to allow 
complementary state approaches in the future, such an approach dictates the 
federalism balance for the agency, regardless of how well that regulatory 
approach actually works in energy markets. 
By contrast, if courts were to more consistently recognize concurrent 
jurisdiction as a starting premise for understanding the allocation of federal–
state authority over new market transactions under energy statutes, any 
departure from this would sit squarely in the wheelhouse of FERC’s 
jurisdiction and expertise, making it incumbent on the agency to only 
preempt states after an open and transparent agency decision-making process.  
An agency preemption approach thus promises to be more democratic and 
consistent with energy statutes than courts imposing relief post hoc through 
a binding judicial precedent, as typically has occurred with dual sovereignty. 
V. Conclusion 
Recent Supreme Court decisions consistently reject dual sovereignty as 
the organizing federalism principle under energy statutes.  The Court’s recent 
evaluation of jurisdictional disputes has been focused on the statutory 
objective of avoiding a regulatory no man’s land, and its fixation on a 
jurisdictional bright line has faded.  In recognizing authorization for 
concurrent jurisdiction under these statutes, the Court’s recent decisions 
direct energy federalism towards a brave new path, inviting regulators to 
consider new institutional arrangements as they address problems in modern 
energy markets. 
Yet this path is not unencumbered.  Recent lower court cases show how 
precedents and doctrinal relics of dual sovereignty can present new 
regulatory gaps in modern energy markets.  Courts and regulators should be 
wary of invoking precedents that fixate on dual sovereignty, especially where 
it is not required by statute.  In modern energy markets, routine adherence to 
a dual sovereignty approach comes at the expense of state and federal 
regulators exploring more effective forms of regulation.  Like other aspects 
of economic and social life, the complexity of modern energy markets 
requires regulators to recognize multiple energy “federalism(s)”—according 
to Heather Gerken’s insightful characterization, a pluralistic rather than a 
singular approach to allocating power between the federal government and 
the states.402 
 
402. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1573 (2012) 
(noting that the “ends of federalism are plural” and questioning scholars who approach federalism 
as if “there is only one means” to achieving these ends). 
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Recent Supreme Court decisions that embrace concurrent jurisdiction 
should serve as a reminder that the federalism in regulatory statutes is not an 
abstract principle that is frozen in time, but instead must adapt to the factual 
and policy features of modern economic life.  In this sense, the Court’s recent 
rejection of dual sovereignty has returned basic decisions regarding the 
federalism balance in energy markets to the agency and political processes, 
rather than relegating it entirely to legalistic formalisms.  By acknowledging 
space for regulators and stakeholders to develop more collaborative 
solutions, the Court has opened up a brave new path for energy federalism—
an approach that could serve the goals of other types of regulation well too.403  
Advancing this trajectory will require courts to ensure that dual sovereignty’s 
doctrinal relics do not impede more democratic, and more dynamic, 
approaches to federalism. 
 
403. Cf. Gluck, supra note 20, at 2003–06 (offering Massachusetts’s health-reform experiment 
as an example of the federal government working with a state to implement a federal goal or policy). 
